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INTRODUCTION

“T

HE President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”1
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.
J.D. expected, Yale University, 2005; D.Phil. expected, Oxford University, 2004.
The authors wish to thank Joyce Appleby, Larry Kramer, and Jack Rakove for their
thoughtful remarks.
1
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
*

**
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We last glimpsed the dangers lurking in these lines during the
electoral crisis of 2000. As sitting Vice-President, Al Gore was the
President of the Senate on January 6, 2001. So it fell to him to
“open all the Certificates” and preside over the vote count.
What if there had still been a dispute over the electoral votes
from Florida? Consider the following scenario: After much Sturm
und Drang, the Florida courts decide that Gore is the winner, but
the Florida legislature grants the state’s twenty-five electoral votes
to George W. Bush. These rival authorities transmit competing
electoral college certificates to Washington D.C., ready to be
opened when the moment of truth arrives. Pursuant to constitutional command, the Vice-President “open[s] all the Certificates.”
What happens next?
The constitutional text does not speak clearly. It authorizes the
Vice-President to “open” the certificates but leaves the extent of
his further powers hidden in the passive voice: “and the Votes shall
then be counted.”
These textual penumbras can be enlightened by precedents that
have gone largely unnoticed for two centuries: the electoral vote
disputes of 1796 and 1800. On these two occasions, John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson found themselves in Al Gore’s position. As
Vice-Presidents in the preceding administration, they were presiding over a vote count in which they were leading candidates, and in
both instances, they used their power to make rulings that favored
their own election as President of the United States. This Article
will present the first in-depth treatment of these precedents,2 emphasizing the dramatic moment when Thomas Jefferson made a
questionable ruling that enhanced his chances of becoming the
next President of the United States, rather than John Adams or
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.
Adams’s decisions in 1797 were perfectly sensible but frame an
analysis of Jefferson’s problematic conduct the next time around.
Vermont had cast four electoral votes for Adams and his running
mate Thomas Pinckney, but the legality of the state’s action had
been publicly impugned and privately questioned by newspapers
and politicians from both political parties.

2

See infra note 5.
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When Adams opened the formal certificates from Vermont they
seemed completely regular, containing no hint of legal deficiency.
Despite their facial perfection, Adams provided members of Congress a formal opportunity to challenge Vermont’s four electoral
votes before announcing that he had won the election by three
votes over Jefferson. He declared himself President only after the
Republicans remained silent.
Thomas Jefferson was remarkably aggressive as President of the
Senate. Georgia’s certificate—granting four electoral votes to Jefferson and four electoral votes to Aaron Burr—was constitutionally defective on its face, a deficiency that was announced on the
floor of Congress and reported by leading newspapers of the day.3
To resolve all doubts, we have located Georgia’s certificate in the
National Archives, and it does indeed reveal striking constitutional
irregularities. Nevertheless, and in contrast to Adams, Jefferson
failed to pause before counting Georgia’s four electoral votes into
the Republican column, declaring the final vote as if nothing were
amiss.
This ruling had serious consequences. With the Georgia votes
included, the official tally was Jefferson seventy-three, Burr seventy-three, Adams sixty-five, Charles C. Pinckney sixty-four, and
John Jay one. To resolve this tie, the two leading candidates went
to their famous runoff in the House, which was only resolved in
Jefferson’s favor on the thirty-sixth ballot.
Had Georgia’s ballot been excluded, the vote count for Jefferson
and for Burr sinks to sixty-nine each, and this would have made a
big difference under the electoral ground rules framed in Philadelphia. As we will explain,4 these rules would have admitted all five
candidates into a runoff in the House. Including Adams, Pinckney,
and Jay in the runoff would have dealt a serious blow to Jefferson’s
prospects. The Federalists would no longer have been stuck with
Aaron Burr as the only alternative to their archenemy Jefferson.
They could have rallied around a much more attractive “compromise” candidate: Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. Without the

3

For further discussion of these matters, see infra notes 52–56 and accompanying
text.
4
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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decisive use of his power as President of the Senate, Jefferson
might never have become President of the United States.
This point was appreciated by contemporaries, but has dropped
out of modern constitutional consciousness.5 After bringing this
forgotten precedent into public view, we will consider its potential
relevance for future Electoral College crises, using a variation on
Bush v. Gore6 as an analytic platform.
I. ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS
This Part sets the stage for Jefferson’s moment of truth as President of the Senate in 1801. Why did the Framers choose the sitting
Vice-President to preside over the vote count in the first place?
What were the rules, and animating ideals, of the Electoral College
prior to enactment of the Twelfth Amendment?
A. Founding Blunders
The vice-presidency gave the Framers a lot of problems. They
believed that a backstop was needed for the President, but they
5

The Vermont problem is mentioned in passing in a variety of sources. J. Hampden
Dougherty, The Electoral System of the United States 33–34 (1906); 2 John J. Lalor,
Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the
United States 63, 68 (New York, Charles E. Merrill 1893); David A. McKnight, The
Electoral System of the United States 65, 260, 290 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippcott & Co.
1878); 1 Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897, at 51–52
(Charles Knowles Bolton ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1975) (1898); 16 The Papers of
James Madison 152, 429 n.2 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Madison Papers]; 2 The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison 1776–1826, at 959 n.23 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Smith]; C.C. Tansill, Congressional Control of the Electoral System, 34 Yale L.J. 511,
516 (1925); L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 Dick. L.
Rev. 321, 326 n.23 (1961). Professor Manning Dauer is the only scholar to explore the
incident in some depth, scrutinizing some, but not all, of the reports about the Vermont issue. See Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists 103–06 (1953).
Jefferson’s decision in 1800 has received even less attention, even though the legal
problems were more acute and the stakes were much higher. There are only a few
mentions of the Georgia incident. See House Spec. Comm., Counting Electoral
Votes, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 44-13, at 30 (1877) [hereinafter Counting Electoral
Votes]; Dougherty, supra, at 35–36; Wroth, supra, at 326 n.23. These various sources
largely cite one another. Vasan Kesavan mentions the issue more recently, citing to
the preceding sources as well as to Professor Ackerman’s unpublished manuscript,
America on the Brink. Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?,
80 N.C. L. Rev. 1653, 1656 n.3, 1707 & n.230 (2002).
6
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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were hard-put to figure out what to do with him while the President was alive.7 For want of anything better, they assigned him the
largely ceremonial office of President of the Senate.
But, alas, this office was not entirely ceremonial, and the Framers simply did not think through the full ramifications of this point.
They recognized that the Senate would generate tie votes from
time to time, and expressly granted the President of the Senate a
tie-breaking vote.8 They failed, however, to consider other moments when the Vice-President might wield real power.
Their most obvious blunder involves impeachment proceedings.
The Founders recognized the absurdity of allowing the VicePresident to preside over the Senate when the President was on
trial for “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”9 He was inevitably an
interested party in this affair, rising to the presidency if the incumbent were convicted. Given his personal stake in the matter, it was
inappropriate for him to preside over the trial as President of the
Senate, and so the text explicitly designates the Chief Justice as the
presiding officer.10
They failed, however, to consider that the Vice-President might
also be impeached. Rather than designating the Chief Justice to
preside over these trials as well, the text leaves this task to the
President of the Senate.11 Read literally, the Constitution seems to
7

We explain later why the vice-presidency was a functional imperative, given the
Framers’ ingenious voting system. See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
8
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”).
9
U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (authorizing “remov[al] from Office” of “[t]he President,
Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States . . . on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”).
10
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.”).
11
Article I, § 3, clause 4 of the United States Constitution designates the VicePresident as “President of the Senate,” while Article I, § 3, clause 6 explicitly designates the Chief Justice as presiding officer “[w]hen the President . . . is tried” in an
impeachment, yet does not expand this exception to include vice-presidential impeachments. It is true, of course, that Article I, § 3, clause 5 authorizes the Senate to
choose other officers, including a President Pro Tem, and implicitly authorizes the latter to preside “in the absence of the Vice President.” This provision would allow the
Vice-President voluntarily to vacate his place at the podium during his impeachment
trial, but nothing in the text requires this. Even if the Vice-President passed the gavel
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authorize the Vice-President to preside over his own impeachment.12
Our present problem reflects the same sort of technical incompetence. Although the Vice-President may be perfectly acceptable
as a ceremonial leader of the Senate, he is a natural candidate in
the next presidential contest. It is an obvious mistake to designate
him as the presiding officer over the electoral vote count. The
temptations for abuse of power are too great—especially since the
textual description of the vote count procedure is so inadequate.
Even if the text had been elaborated with great precision, it was
still wrong to give one candidate any sort of strategic advantage
over his rivals. The designation of the President of the Senate as
presiding officer was nothing more than a thoughtless extension of
a ceremonial post to a position of power.
If anyone had focused on the matter, the Convention could have
cured the lapse easily. There was an obvious solution: The Constitution expressly replaced the Vice-President with the Chief Justice
when it comes to presiding over the Senate during presidential impeachments. Just as the Chief Justice displaced him on these occasions, he could have replaced him at the electoral vote count.13
to the President Pro Tem, that senator could be a blatant partisan who might use his
power either to protect or to destroy the incumbent. Rather than allowing the President Pro Tem to intervene, the Framers should have placed the Chief Justice in control of vice-presidential, as well as presidential, impeachments.
12
We are certainly not the first to make this point. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis 64–65 (1996);
Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1341, 1357 & n.72 (1983); Stephen
Carter, The Role of the Courts in Separation of Powers Disputes, 68 Wash. U. L.Q.
669, 675 (1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew,
14 Const. Comment. 245, 245–46 (1997); Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President:
The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 859, 862 n.15
(1999). But see Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 122 n.59 (1995) (arguing that general
conflict-of-interest principles prevent Vice-Presidents from presiding over their own
impeachment trials); John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of
Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 457, 462 & n.30 (1964)
(noting that “[p]resumably” the President Pro Tem of the Senate would preside).
13
The Founders had demonstrated a general awareness of the problems of asking an
official to serve as a judge in his own case. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10, at 47
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”).
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But the Convention never spotted this problem, or its obvious
cure, and the forces of intellectual inertia propelled the President
of the Senate into an unsuitable role. This failure is understandable, if not precisely excusable. The Convention spent an enormous amount of time on methods for selecting the President, repeatedly failing to find a solution that commanded enduring
support. Hoping to get out of Philadelphia, the delegates finally
pushed the problem onto the docket of a special committee,
chaired by David Brearley, charged with solving previously irresolvable issues.14 Despite the pressures of time, the delegates did
spend most of two days—September 5 and 6, 1787—on the Brearley proposals,15 but two days were not nearly enough to confront all
the problems involved in their novel design. There were many larger questions at stake than the role of the President of the Senate.
With their eyes wandering to the exits, the Framers never focused
on the absurdity of their job assignment.16
So our problem arises as the result of technical incompetence at
the Founding—which does not make it any less of a problem.
B. A World Without Parties
To set the stage further, consider the larger structure within
which John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were operating at the
moment of the vote count. We must return to the original understanding of the Electoral College before the enactment of the
Twelfth Amendment. This requires something more than the mas14

Called the “Committee of Postponed Parts,” the Brearley group was selected on
August 31, 1787. 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 280 (Jonathan Elliott ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) (1836)
[hereinafter Elliot]. It was composed of eleven elected members, one from each participating state. Id.
15
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 505–31 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
16
By far the best treatment of the Electoral College is provided by Professor
Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. Am. Hist. 35 (1986). Slonim is particularly effective in demonstrating how the Electoral College cleverly solved a host of
key problems at the time—most notably (1) enabling the small states and the slave
states to extend to the presidency the disproportionate voting power they had won
previously in the design of Congress, while (2) allowing the Convention to accommodate separation-of-powers principles. Id. at 51–58. A discussion of these dimensions is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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tery of a few antiquated rules. These rules were based on an entirely different vision of American politics, and we will not get very
far without grasping how this Founding vision differs from our
own.
For modern Americans, the two-party system is a pillar of democratic life. Fair competition between political parties is viewed
as the great engine for disciplining despotic power. For us, an election without party competition is no election at all.
This was not so for the Founders. They equated party with faction, and thought parties an unmitigated evil. Worse yet, they did
not reach this judgment after soberly considering the democratic
case for party competition. Nothing resembling the modern party
system had yet emerged as a historical reality.17
Nor did classical republican theory encourage the Founders to
glimpse the future that lay just over the horizon. The great republican writers of the past—Aristotle and Cicero, Machiavelli and
Harrington—presented very different visions of the well-ordered
state. They were alike, however, in one crucial respect: Each
equated party division with factional strife and deemed it the great
nemesis of civilization. Republics died when leaders factionalized,
with each cabal placing its narrow interests ahead of the public
good. The result was an escalating cycle of instability and incivility,
culminating in the despotic ascendancy of a Caesar or a Cromwell.
The fundamental challenge was somehow to induce leaders to put
the public good ahead of their own—and to sustain the unity of the
Commonwealth against the ever-present dangers of factional disintegration.18
These classical teachings resonated with the Founders’ revolutionary experience. During their struggle against England, political
division meant weakness before the imperial foe and bordered on
betrayal: We will all hang separately if we do not hang together.
This attitude, once formed and battle-hardened, was difficult to
transcend.
17

Even in England, the words “Whig” and “Tory” referred largely to extended groupings of elite families, locked in factional struggle for power and patronage. L.B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (1929). For an appreciation of Namier as a political historian, see Linda Colley, Lewis Namier 46–71 (1989).
18
For a penetrating survey of eighteenth-century opposition to the notion of political parties, see Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System 1–39 (1969).
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Even Madison did not attempt to do so. His work at the Constitutional Convention and in The Federalist linked party with faction,
condemning it as evil.19 Madison’s aim was to use Enlightenment
political science to design a better constitutional machine to constrain the beast.20 Rather than organizing a sound two-party system,
the Madisonian republic tried to create a space for leaders to transcend the rule of faction altogether. The Constitution’s basic tactic
is divide-and-conquer. By creating government on a continental
scale, the Framers hoped to make it difficult to organize large parties: Rather than one or two continental groupings, there would be
a host of self-interested factions pushing and shoving for power.
This labile structure would make it possible for patrician civic
leaders like George Washington to rise above the fray and govern
in the public interest. Rather than draft a Constitution for a twoparty democracy, the Framers sought to organize a non-party republic.21
Though this notion is strange to us, the original design of the
Electoral College makes no sense without it. For us, it seems only
natural for the major parties to take on the primary burden of selecting the leading candidates for the presidency, but this was a
non-starter for the Framers. Rather than delegating this task to political parties, they hoped to design a scheme by which great
statesmen would transcend the dynamics of faction. The model for
such a leader, of course, sat before them as the presiding officer of
the Constitutional Convention: George Washington. The challenge
was to construct a system that would enable others like him to rise
to the top.
The problem was made more acute by the nature of eighteenthcentury society. Politics, much more so than now, was emphatically
local. Commercial and landed elites might compete for attention in
each of the states, but few local leaders would have the opportunity
to prove their mettle on a national basis.

19

For a general discussion on the role of faction at the time of the Founding, see
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, at 559–60
(1969).
20
See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 165–99 (1991).
21
Hofstadter, supra note 18, at 40–73; Daniel Sisson, The American Revolution of
1800, at 23–69 (1974).
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As the Founders well understood, the war against England provided the revolutionary generation with exceptional opportunities
to project themselves onto the continental stage. By virtue of their
service in the patriots’ army, Washington and others had demonstrated their republican virtue—or lack of it—to an attentive audience in all thirteen states. The difficulties of wartime coordination
also required civilian politicians to engage in extraordinary levels
of interstate interaction as well as mutual assessment. But in ordinary times, would there be a steady supply of such “Continental
Characters”?22
The more optimistic members of the Convention predicted that
“Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more coalesce,”23 but others were not so sure.24 Unless steps were taken,
each state’s electors might join together and vote for a favorite son,
leading to perplexity when all the votes were counted. This is
where the Founders tried to economize on the short supply of true
leaders through clever institutional engineering. Why not give two
votes to each elector, but allow him to cast only one for a citizen
from his own state? As Gouverneur Morris explained, “one vote is
to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote will not be
thrown away, • •the votes will fall on characters eminent & generally known.”25
The vice-presidency became a functional imperative at this stage
in the constitutional design. If the Framers had trusted electors to
ignore local favorites, they might well have dispensed with the of-

22

2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 501 (remarks of James Wilson, Sept. 4, 1787).
Id. (remarks of James Wilson, Sept. 4, 1787); see also id. (remarks of Abraham
Baldwin, Sept. 4, 1787) (discussing how “increasing intercourse among the people of
the States, would render important characters less & less unknown”).
24
George Mason was the most emphatic, asserting that a winner would fail to be selected “nineteen times in twenty.” Id. at 500 (remarks of George Mason, Sept. 4,
1787); see also id. at 512 (remarks of George Mason, Sept. 5, 1787).
25
Id. at 512 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris, Sept. 5, 1787). Morris was Pennsylvania’s representative on the Brearley Committee of Postponed Parts, which was responsible for the Electoral College plan but did not make a formal report in support
of its recommendations. Since Morris’s arguments mesh so tightly with the Committee’s proposal, it is likely that they were broadly shared, especially since analogous
points were made earlier in the Convention by other members of the Brearley Committee. See id. at 113 (remarks of Hugh Williamson, July 25, 1787); id. (remarks of
Gouverneur Morris, July 25, 1787); id. at 114 (remarks of James Madison, July 25,
1787).
23
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fice.26 Instead of creating a do-nothing (and politically mischievous)
President of the Senate, they could have responded to the problem
of presidential death or resignation by simply designating an official—perhaps the Secretary of State, perhaps the Speaker of the
House—to serve as acting President until a special election could
be held. In fact, this was the method used by the Second Congress
to resolve the succession problem if both the President and VicePresident died or resigned.27
The Framers’ ingenious two-vote system, however, invited the
creation of two distinct offices. Without the vice-presidency, electors might leave one of their ballots blank and vote the other for a
native son. But with the second spot in existence, the electors
would hardly let it go to waste. One can imagine the thought process: “Of course George Washington is an out-of-stater, but I might
as well vote for the best man since the Constitution requires me to
move beyond our favorite sons. And in any event, I did get a
chance to cast a ballot for our regional favorite, the Honorable
John Q. Squire, who might even have a chance to be VicePresident!” Although most Vice-Presidents would likely waste
their time in office as senatorial figureheads, this was beside the
point. The underlying goal was to construct a clever system for selecting a President with a broad-based reputation for political virtue. When Elbridge Gerry (himself a future Vice-President) expressed a desire to eliminate the office, another delegate—Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina—responded that “such an officer as

26

See generally Amar & Amar, supra note 12, at 113–26 (arguing that Cabinet officials should follow the Vice-President in presidential succession). In the context of
our argument, the Founders could have saved the step of creating a Vice-President
and gone straight to Cabinet succession.
27
The first succession statute contemplated a special election in such circumstances,
designating the President Pro Tempore of the Senate to serve in the interim. Act of
March 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9–10, 1 Stat. 239, 240–41 (repealed 1886). In 1886, Congress
passed a law removing the President Pro Tempore and the Speaker of the House
from the line of succession, and placed members of the Cabinet in the line of succession. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). This statute also allowed Congress to decide whether to call a special election to pick a new President.
Id. In 1947, Congress passed a new law redesigning the line of succession after the
Vice-President, which also eliminated all authority for a special election. See 3 U.S.C.
§ 19 (2000). The Twenty-fifth Amendment, effective in 1967, provides a procedure for
replacing the Vice-President in a rapid fashion, hopefully rendering unnecessary the
invocation of the provisions of the 1947 statute. U.S. Const. amend. XXV.
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vice-President was not wanted. He was introduced only for the
sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time.”28
The original design had a second clever feature. Suppose, as was
the case in both 1796 and 1800, that the College contained 138
members who cast 276 votes. Under the 1787 Constitution, the top
choice could become President even if his name appeared on only
seventy of the 276 votes.29 The point of the Enlightenment machine
was to construct the impression that the President was a man of
truly national character even if the pickings were pretty slim. A
man could become President when he was the second choice of a
bare majority of electors.
Even this clever expedient could sometimes fail to produce the
simulacrum of a George Washington. Politics might become so
state-centered that no candidate could gain even a minimal level of
national support. How to proceed?
The Brearley Committee proposed a back-up procedure under
which the President would be selected by the Senate from the top
five vote-getters in the Electoral College.30 But the Senate had already been granted many special powers, and granting it still more
threatened to give the entire system an “aristocratic complexion.”31
This objection proved persuasive, leading to the most peculiar voting system known to our constitutional system. The Convention
shifted the locus of authority from the Senate to the House, but retained the Senate’s principle of equality in state voting power. For
28

2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 537.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States
and vote by Ballot for two Persons. . . . The Person having the greatest Number of
Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of
Electors appointed . . . .”) (amended 1804). The Twelfth Amendment, effective in
1804, changed this rule. U.S. Const. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President . . . they shall
name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted
for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of
votes for each . . . . The person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President. . . . The person having the greatest number of votes as VicePresident, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed.”).
30
2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 494.
31
Id. at 524 (remarks of Hugh Williamson, Sept. 6, 1787); see id. at 527 (remarks of
Roger Sherman, Sept. 6, 1787); id. (remarks of George Mason, Sept. 6, 1787).
29
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presidential purposes only, each state delegation in the House
would cast a single vote—Delaware’s single representative and
Virginia’s large delegation counting equally32—and the balloting
would proceed until a candidate received the votes of an absolute
majority of the states.33
This transformation of the people’s House into a state-centered
assembly may seem odd to us, but it made quite a bit of sense
within the overall Founding framework. To put the point in numerical terms: If no single candidate garnered as many as seventy
of the 276 votes cast by 138 electors, this would indicate that
American politics had taken an emphatically decentralizing turn.
As a consequence, should not the back-up mechanism likewise decentralize by giving an equal vote to each state in the Union?
Perhaps, though, strong nationalists like Madison and Hamilton
were not convinced. They tried to eliminate the back-up procedure, or at least reduce the frequency of its use.34 These efforts
were successfully resisted by the small states, which feared that
electors from three or four large states might otherwise be in a position to dictate the presidential choice when a consensus candidate

32

In 1800, for example, Virginia’s population of 807,557 (and its twenty-two representatives) and Delaware’s population of 64,273 (and its one representative) would
each be afforded a single vote in the House runoff. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical
Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, at 13, 693 (1960).
33
The Senate retained the power to select a Vice-President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1,
cl. 3 (“In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest
Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot
the Vice President.”) (amended 1804). The Twelfth Amendment altered this scheme.
U.S. Const. amend. XII (“The person having the greatest number of votes as VicePresident, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two
highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President.”).
34
2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 513 (remarks of James Madison, Sept. 5, 1787) (“Mr
Madison considered it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part of
the Legislature improbable.”). Later in the day, Madison and Williamson moved to
amend the Brearley proposal to enable the Electoral College to name the President if
“• •of the Electors should vote for the same person.” Id. at 514. In 1800, this would
have permitted a presidential candidate to gain office on the basis of forty-six out of
the 276 ballots cast by the electors. Hamilton would have gone further, eliminating
the back-up procedure entirely and awarding the presidency to the Electoral College
winner regardless of the number of his electoral votes. Id. at 525 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton, Sept. 6, 1787).
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was lacking.35 If no national figure could gain one of the two places
on a majority of the electors’ ballots, the small states insisted on a
runoff in the House in which each state counted equally. Under
this scenario, the large states might dominate the process of nomination, but the small ones had a large say in the final decision.
All this may have seemed sensible enough, but the time devoted
to hammering it out led the Convention to slight a second design
issue. This did not involve the failure of a candidate of continental
stature to emerge from the Electoral College, but a mathematical
oddity arising from the complexities of the emerging design. Since
the Founders had given each elector two votes in their desire to
overcome localism, it was now mathematically possible for several
candidates to turn up on a majority of ballots—indeed, two could
end up in a dead heat, with each winning, say, seventy-three votes
apiece. How to break this tie?
This question raises issues distinct from those involved when no
presidential candidate has gained widespread support. In the nomajority case, the small states might reasonably suppose that the
leader in the Electoral College would be a “favorite son” from a
large state. After all, these local favorites could fish from a larger
pool of electors than notables from small states, and so they would
get to the top of a long list of candidates of merely local eminence.
Since the small states would not play a major role in nominating
candidates, it was reasonable for them to insist on greater importance in the final selection.
But the small states had no similar grievance when two candidates tied with the same majority vote total. Under this scenario,
both candidates would have won their seventy-three votes by collecting electors from states of all sizes. In contrast to the nomajority case, there was no obvious bias against the small states in
the tied-majority case. It follows that the Founders’ odd voting
rule—under which each state delegation in the House cast a single

35

The anxieties of the small states served as a leitmotiv throughout the Convention’s interminable discussions of the presidential selection problem. See Slonim, supra note 16, at 48–51, 55–56. Indeed, when Madison proposed to dilute the required
Electoral College majority, he immediately encountered the objection that his
amendment “would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom they
pleased.” 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 514 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 5, 1787).
Madison’s proposal lost by a vote of nine-to-two. Id.
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ballot to select a President—was distinctly undermotivated in the
tied-majority context. While it might have been sensible to give
equal voting power to big Virginia and little Delaware when no
candidate gained broad national support, this curious rule made little sense when two broad-based candidacies gained precisely the
same number of votes.
Generally speaking, the delegates were quite skilled at identifying fine-grained issues of institutional design. Indeed, they spotted
an analogous issue in an earlier debate on presidential selection,
but nothing came of it.36 If they had given themselves adequate
time, some sharp-eyed delegate likely would have remarked upon
the distinctive character of the tied-majority case. Time was running short, however, when the Brearley proposals came to the
floor, and no one focused on the problem in the rush to resolve a
host of more contentious issues.37
The Founders’ lapse can be extenuated if we recall that they
were legislating for a world without national political parties. In
such a world, centuries might go by without a dead-heat between
36

On August 24, 1787, the Convention was considering a plan under which the
President would be selected by a joint session of the House and Senate, each member
casting a single ballot, and the delegates spotted a potential problem posed by a tie
vote. 2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 403 (“Mr. Read moved ‘that in case the numbers for
the two highest in votes should be equal, then the President of the Senate shall have
an additional casting vote’, which was disagreed to by a general negative.”).
37
The window of opportunity for issue-spotting was particularly narrow, given the
proposal that came to the floor. Recall that the Brearley Committee had initially proposed that the Senate, not the House, be given the task of selecting a President under
the back-up procedure. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. If the Senate had
retained this task, the Convention would have had no choice but to maintain a voting
rule that granted equality to each state. It was only when the Convention voted to
shift the locus of selection authority to the House that new design options, and concomitant complications, arose. But this vote occurred on September 6, toward the end
of the Convention’s debates. Here is Madison’s report of the critical colloquy:
Mr. Williamson suggested as better than an eventual choice by the Senate, that
this choice should be made by the Legislature, voting by States and not per capita.
Mr. Sherman suggested the House of Reps. as preferable to “the Legislature”,
and moved, accordingly,
To strike out the words “The Senate shall immediately choose &c.” and insert
“The House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them
for President, the members from each State having one vote.”
Col: Mason liked the latter mode best as lessening the aristocratic influence of
the Senate.
2 Farrand, supra note 15, at 527.
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two candidates with the national stature required to win a majority.
Did not the Convention have better things to do than create wheels
within wheels for dealing with such an unlikely possibility?
Rather than create an entirely new voting system for the tiedmajority case, the Convention modified only one feature of its
standard House runoff to take it into account. If the odd case did
arise, the Constitution provides that only the two candidates
locked in the tie would enter the House runoff. When all candidates fell short of a majority, however, the five leading candidates
enter the runoff (even if the top two were tied).
Since this rule-within-a-rule is central to our story, the relevant
constitutional text deserves careful scrutiny:
The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of
Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such
Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of
Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them
for President; and if no person have a Majority, then from the
five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse
the President.38

Since these rules are rather complex, we explore their operation
through a series of mathematical examples. Begin with the case of
perfect compliance, where the electoral vote count proceeds without a legal hitch. During both the elections of 1796 and 1800, there
were 138 electors casting 256 votes for President. So long as we assume perfect compliance, the operation of the runoff rules is
straightforward. The magic number is seventy: “a Majority of the
whole Number of Electors appointed.” If the two leading candidates tie with seventy votes or more, the text requires a two-man
runoff; if they get sixty-nine or less, it requires the two leaders to
join in a race involving the top five candidates.
Matters get trickier when there is imperfect compliance, since
there are two different ways in which a state may fail to register its
electoral preferences. The first scenario arose in 1796 and involved
Vermont. The problem—or so it was alleged—was that the state
had failed to appoint its four electors in a legally valid fashion. As
38

U.S. Const. art. 2, § 1, cl. 3 (amended 1804) (emphasis added).
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we shall see, this charge was rejected. If the attack on Vermont had
been upheld, however, the total number of electors “appointed” by
the states would have amounted only to 134, not 138. This reduction, in turn, would have required a change in the “magic number”
of electoral votes needed to avoid a five-candidate runoff. With
only 134 electors “appointed,” the constitutional majority required
was no longer seventy, but sixty-eight, votes.
A different result obtains under the second scenario of imperfect
compliance, which arose in 1800 and involved Georgia. This time
around, nobody alleged that Georgia had failed to make a valid
appointment of its four electors. The difficulty arose only at the
second stage—the four electors did not cast ballots that satisfied
the formal requirements laid down by the Constitution. While this
might have resulted in the disqualification of the four Georgia
votes, it did not require a recalculation of the “magic number.”
Since Georgia’s electors had undoubtedly been “appointed,” the
number of electors from the entire Union remained at 138, and
candidates required a majority of at least seventy votes to avoid a
five-man runoff in the House.
This point would create a big problem when Jefferson presided
over the electoral vote count of 1801. But we are now talking about
1787. As the days grew short in September, nobody at the Convention worried about the outside chance that an incumbent VicePresident, sitting as the President of the Senate, might manipulate
an oddball rule to push himself into a House runoff with one rival
rather than four. There were many more serious things to think
about, as the Framers contemplated the fierce struggle for ratification that lay ahead.
II. THE VERMONT PRECEDENT
Washington’s presence at the head of the Constitutional Convention assured the delegates that their larger vision of a non-party
republic was a living reality. Here was a man who had proved his
public spirit through years of selfless service on the battlefield. This
demonstration of “public character,” not any display of partisan
wiles, would predictably win him a unanimous vote for the presidency.39 Once he had set the nation on the right course, would the
39

See James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection 41–88 (1979).
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constitutional machine assist his successors in sustaining his example of nonpartisan statesmanship?
Washington was grimly determined to try. He included both
Hamilton and Jefferson in his first Cabinet, and desperately sought
to keep these great rivals in harness. But it was not to be. By the
end of his first administration, the two party leaders were already
locked in highly charged ideological conflict, and by the time
Washington left office, the division between Federalists and Republicans had come to dominate the political scene. 40 The ink was
hardly dry on the Constitution before its fundamental political
premise began to disintegrate. America was becoming a protomodern two-party democracy, raising entirely unexpected challenges to the Founding design for a republic dominated by nonparty notables.41
A. The Rise of Party
Washington’s Farewell Address nicely framed the transition to
this new order.42 On the one hand, it was a great act of nonpartisan
statesmanship—in refusing a third term in office, Washington established a precedent against the pernicious tendency toward
presidencies-for-life. On the other hand, partisan politics provided
a backdrop to Washington’s grave farewell. He postponed his announcement until September 17, 1796. This put the Republicans at
a serious disadvantage in the presidential election campaign, as Jefferson and his supporters were not prepared to contest Washington’s decision to continue in office.43 Nevertheless, the Republicans
almost managed to defeat John Adams, Washington’s VicePresident and a man devoted to Washington’s non-party ideal, who
40

For a recent blow-by-blow account of the politics of the 1790s, see Bernard A.
Weisberger, America Afire: Jefferson, Adams, and the Revolutionary Election of
1800 (2000).
41
To be sure, there were many respects in which the two-party competition of the
1790s differed from that of subsequent periods. Professor Ackerman explores this
matter at greater length in his other work. See Bruce Ackerman, America on the
Brink: The Constitutional Crisis of the Early Republic 25–43 (2001) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
42
A perceptive treatment of both the politics and substance of the Farewell Address
is provided in Stanley Elkins & Eric McKittrick, The Age of Federalism 489–97
(1993).
43
See generally id. (discussing partisan aspects of Washington’s Farewell Address).
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was now obliged to make his way in the ascendant world of party
politics.
Adams’s official position as Vice-President and his past service
to the country made him an obvious candidate, but Alexander
Hamilton was the true leader of the Federalist Party. Hamilton attempted to manipulate the Founders’ ingenious two-vote system to
deprive Adams of the presidency without allowing Thomas Jefferson to take the prize.44 His scheme involved propelling the Federalists’ second candidate, Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina,45 to
first place in the Electoral College. If every Federalist elector in
the north voted for both Adams and Pinckney, this would allow
South Carolina to put its favorite son ahead by voting for Pinckney
but not Adams. To achieve this end, Hamilton engaged in some
devious maneuvers that created a problem when the time came for
the President of the Senate to count the votes.
For Hamilton’s scheme to succeed, he needed to convince the
northern Federalists to resist the temptations of regional favoritism
in their second ballot choices and cast their ballots for Pinckney as
well as Adams. Professor Manning Dauer tells the story:
[Hamilton] attempted to supply the stimulus which would cause
the electors to support Pinckney. In the Boston Centinel of December 7, just as the electors were meeting, the following paragraph appeared, under a New York date line of November 26:
“We have good authority to believe the election of electors in
Vermont is invalid—–being grounded on a Resolve of the Legislature, not a law.”
Underneath this there appeared a note by the editor declaring
that it was certainly to be hoped that this would not be true. If so,
it shows the “necessity of union in the electors.”46

The editor’s implicit logic was clear enough. Since the race with the
Republicans was going to be close, the loss of Vermont’s four votes

44

The best account is provided by Dauer, supra note 5, at 92–111.
Not to be confused with Charles Pinckney, who ran as Adams’s running mate in
1800. Thomas Pinckney had recently returned home after negotiating a popular treaty
with Spain. See Frances Leigh Williams, A Founding Family: The Pinckneys of South
Carolina 304–09 (1978).
46
Dauer, supra note 5, at 103.
45
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for Adams and Pinckney might mean that the only Federalist who
could beat Jefferson was Pinckney, aided by South Carolina’s favorite-son vote. While South Carolina’s desertion of Adams might
be regrettable, surely Pinckney was better than Jefferson.
Hamilton’s rumor failed to generate its desired effect.47 Despite
the disheartening news from Vermont, only thirteen of Massachusetts’s electors voted a straight Adams-Pinckney ticket.48 The other
three voted for Adams but then cast a ballot for regional favorites—as did ten other Federalist electors from northern states. As a
consequence, Pinckney lagged far behind Adams in the electoral
vote—he received only fifty-nine votes to Adams’s seventy-one.
This gave the vice-presidency to Jefferson, with sixty-eight votes.
Jefferson’s running mate, Aaron Burr, was also victimized by favorite-son voting, and gained only thirty votes.49
Though Hamilton’s stratagem failed to produce northern solidarity for Pinckney, it did succeed in casting a shadow on the votecounting ritual. If Vermont’s four votes were ruled invalid, Adams
would lose the presidency to Jefferson by a single vote, sixty-eight
to sixty-seven.50 With remarkable speed, the Framers’ technical
47

Hamilton also impugned the Vermont vote in personal correspondence. On December 1, 1796, he wrote to Jeremiah Wadsworth of his plan to throw the election to
Thomas Pinckney, stating that:
Judge Tichener in passing through informed me that from something which
had occurred to his recollection while here he feared that the votes of Vermont
would be lost for want of being warranted by a subsisting legislative Act. If so,
Adams will not have sufficient votes to prevent the question going to the House
of Representatives & then we can be at no loss for the result. The whole number I venture to depend on for Adams (including Vermont & two in Pennsylvania) is 73. Take off Vermont and there will be 69 which is less by one than the
whole number of Electors.
It may be said that Georgia also is irregular. This I do not consider as certain.
But if so at first there was time enough to discover & rectify it. Not so as to
Vermont. Besides who will take care to have the necessary authentic proof from
Georgia? From Vermont it can be had & our patriots are not likely to neglect it.
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Wadsworth (Dec. 1, 1796), in 20 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 418, 418 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) (footnote call
numbers omitted). The editor of Hamilton’s papers notes that “Tichener” is Isaac
Tichenor of Vermont, later a Federalist senator and then governor of the state. Id. at
419 n.3.
48
3 Annals of Cong. 1543 (1797).
49
Id. at 1543–44 (reporting entire tally).
50
If Vermont’s selection of its electors had in fact been invalid, Jefferson’s sixtyeight votes would have sufficed to gain him the presidency without a runoff. Without
Vermont’s four electors, only 134 Electors would have been validly appointed, and a
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blunders were coming home to roost. It was a serious enough mistake to allow the sitting Vice-President to preside over his own
election returns in the gentlemanly world of non-party notables.
But this error was compounded once the vice-presidency had become swept up in the overheated context of a new and unfamiliar
form of party competition. How would the system respond to the
challenge?
B. Rumors and Restraint
The four Vermont electors for President and Vice-President cast
their ballots on December 7, 179651—two full months before John
Adams was scheduled to preside over the vote count on February
8, 1797. As word of the Vermont votes trickled out of Montpelier
to the larger world, newspapers and politicians throughout the
country attacked their validity.52 The New York Minerva & Mercantile Evening Advertiser began the controversy on November 26:
majority of these amounted to sixty-eight votes. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The
Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be
a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed . . . .”) (amended 1804) (emphasis added). See supra note 38 and accompanying text for further discussion.
51
The original electoral votes from Vermont state this date explicitly. For a report
describing our inspection of the Vermont electoral votes, and where they can be
found, see infra note 106.
52
We reviewed the following newspapers: (1) Columbian Centinel from Boston,
Massachusetts: Editions from June 1796–March 18, 1797 were examined because Professor Dauer quotes this newspaper as covering the situation surrounding the Vermont votes, Dauer, supra note 5, at 103–04; (2) South-Carolina State Gazette: Editions
from July 4, 1796–February 1797 were examined because it is a southern newspaper,
and a Vermont newspaper story stated that there were no problems with the Vermont
votes and that it was all part of some sort of southern plot; (3) Columbian Mirror &
Alexandria Gazette: Editions from October 1796–February 1797 were examined because it is another southern newspaper and one published in Thomas Jefferson’s
home state (Jefferson had much to gain if the Vermont votes were deemed invalid);
(4) Kentucky Gazette: Editions from December 1796–March 1797 were examined to
determine if there was any mention of the problems with the Kentucky electoral
votes, discussed infra note 75, and also because it was another (at least quasi-)
“southern” newspaper; (5) Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser: Editions from October
1796–February 1797 were examined because its publisher, Simon Greenleaf, was a
prominent Republican, see Jerome Mushkat, Matthew Livingston Davis and the Political Legacy of Aaron Burr, in 3 American Cities 109, 109 (Neil Larry Shumsky ed.,
1996), and problems with the Vermont votes would have worked in favor of the Republican party; (6) Aurora & General Advertiser: Editions from June 1796–February
1797 were examined because it was printed in the capitol city at the time of the election; and (7) Gazette of the United States: Editions from June 1796–February 1797
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We have good authority to believe the election of Electors in
Vermont is invalid—being grounded only on a Resolve of the
Legislature, not a law. This is supposed to have been known to
the ‘Patriots,’ of that State at the time. It being now too late to
correct the mistake, it has leaked out in whispers.53

Newspaper attacks on the Vermont vote continued through December.54
were examined because it was the leading Federalist newspaper published in the capitol city.
53
Minerva & Mercantile Evening Advertiser (New York), Nov. 26, 1796, at 3.
54
On November 30, the Gazette of the United States reported that “Vermont, who
has chosen electors, is to have no vote on the occasion.” Gazette of the United States
(Philadelphia), Nov. 30, 1796, at 3. As we have seen, Professor Dauer emphasizes a
December 7 story from the Columbian Centinel. Dauer, supra note 5, at 103–04. Here
is the full Centinel text:
The account received in town yesterday of the probable loss of the Vermont
votes for President and Vice-President, may have an unfortunate effect on the
decision of the Electors of this State. Every one feels deeply interested in the
event, and the subject was yesterday discussed in the different private circles.
Too many opinions have appeared to preponderate in favour of supporting Mr.
PINCKNEY, at the risque of sacrificing Mr. ADAMS; but it will become the
electors to consider that the voice of the people at large ought to be their guide.
If we mean to make our contribution respectable in the eyes of Europeans, if
we mean to prove that a republican government signifies the expression of the
public voice, we must make it appear that the public voice designates the man
who is to fill the first office in our government. If this is not the case, we had
better at once trust all to the benevolence of Providence, for ours will become a
government of chance, and of the worst kind of chance. Not only our national
dignity, but all our essential interests depend upon our respective offices being
filled by the men contemplated by the people; and if ever this great principle is
done away, the loss of our liberties must soon follow. Besides all this, are we not
to consider a little what is due to Mr. ADAMS? Will it be grateful, will it be just
to act as if we looked upon him only as a convenience; that we think it will be
well enough to have him for President, but as well to have any body else? More
than all, and we ought seriously to weigh it, Mr. ADAMS it is ascertained by
the best information from the different States, will have a greater number of
votes than Mr. JEFFERSON even if Vermont is out of the question. Shall a
momentary pusillanimity in Mr. ADAMS’s friends put Mr. PINCKNEY in the
presidential chair? Shall we by grasping at a shadow, lose the substance? No,
Mr. RUSSELL, firmness is expected in the electors, and from their characters
we may fairly presume they will not disappoint the public.
Columbian Centinel (Boston), Dec. 7, 1796, at 2. The Aurora & General Advertiser of
December reported that “[t]he Vermont election is said to be illegal from the nonexistence of any law or resolution under which the Electors could act. The law under
which they voted four years ago was temporary, and from a mistaken impression that
it was of a permanent nature the electors of that State find themselves unauthorized.”
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 12, 1796, at 2. On December 17,
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These reports contained three charges. The first denied that
Vermont had enacted a valid law authorizing the procedure by
which it had selected its electors. Though it was broadly recognized
that Vermont had passed such a law in 1791, “We understand that
the law alluded to made provision only for the election in 1792, and
of course then expired.”55 The second claimed that Vermont’s appointments were invalid because they were made through a “resolve” rather than a formal legislative enactment.56 The third argued that Vermont had violated a 1792 federal statute requiring
the states to appoint their electors within a period of “thirty-four
days preceding the first Wednesday in December.”57

however, the Aurora wrote that “[w]e have heard no reason for setting aside the
Vermont Electors, that appears of importance sufficient to produce so disagreeable
an effect.” Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2; see also
Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Dec. 15, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers,
supra note 5, at 428, 429 (“[T]he probabi[li]ty is that if Vermont has no choice that J.
will have the majority necessary to his appointm[en]t.”).
Newspapers of all political persuasions reported on the problem. The “decidedly
Republican” Aurora & General Advertiser, David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of
American Conservatism 419 (1965), carried the most stories, while the “moderately
Republican” Kentucky Gazette, id. at 423, carried only one. Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Nov. 29, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Nov. 30, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 12, 1796,
at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 15, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2; Aurora & General Advertiser
(Philadelphia), Dec. 29, 1796, at 2; Kentucky Gazette, Jan. 18, 1797, at 2.
The “decidedly Federalist” Columbian Centinel, Fischer, supra, at 414, ran a story;
the “decidedly Federalist” Gazette of the United States, id. at 419, discussed Vermont;
the “moderately Federalist” Columbian Mirror & Alexandria Gazette, id. at 420, carried a story; the “moderately Federalist” South-Carolina State Gazette, id. at 422, ran
a story; and the “very moderately Federalist” Minerva & Mercantile Evening Advertiser, id. at 417, discussed the Vermont problem. Columbian Centinel (Boston), Dec.
7, 1796, at 2; Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Nov. 30, 1796, at 3; Columbian Mirror & Alexandria Gazette (Boston), Dec. 27, 1796, at 3; South-Carolina State
Gazette, Dec. 20, 1796; Minerva & Mercantile Evening Advertiser (New York), Nov.
26, 1796, at 3.
55
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 29, 1796, at 2; see 2 Smith, supra note 5, at 959 n.23; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at
2.
56
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2.
57
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 239, 239; see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.
4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors . . . .”); Aurora &
General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 17, 1796, at 2 (making this argument).
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None of these charges had legal merit. We have personally examined the Vermont archives58 and we have determined that the
1791 statute regulating presidential electors was not a temporary
measure for 1792 but a standing procedure for the indefinite future. Under its terms, Vermont’s electors would be selected by a
majority of the members of a “Grand Committee” consisting of
“the Governor and Council and House of Representatives.”59 There

58

We examined various materials in Vermont. At the State Department of Libraries, we examined: (1) compilations of laws passed by the Vermont state legislature
from 1778–1799; (2) records of state legislative proceedings from 1778–1799; (3) the
public papers of Thomas Chittenden, a leading figure in Vermont politics; (4) Vermont electoral statistics; (5) records of the Council of Censors, a body created by the
Vermont Constitution of 1786 and charged with overseeing the legislative and executive branches of Vermont for compliance with the state Constitution; (6) editions of
the Vermont Journal from January 1796–March 1797; (7) editions of the Rutland Herald from January 1796–March 1797; and (8) editions of the Vermont Gazette from
January 1796–March 1797. At the Secretary of State’s office in Montpelier, we
searched the personal papers of prominent Vermonters from the 1790s, additional
personal papers relating to the 1796 presidential electors, and records of the Governor and Council of Censors. At the Vermont Historical Society in Barre, the personal
papers of additional prominent Vermonters from the 1790s were examined. Scholarship on early Vermont was also consulted. See, e.g., Roy Bearse, Vermont: A Guide
to the Green Mountain State (1966); Hosea Beckley, The History of Vermont (Brattleboro, Vt., Geoge A. Salisbury 1846); Cora Cheney, Vermont: The State with the
Storybook Past (1976); Charles Edward Crane, Let Me Show You Vermont (1937);
Walter Hill Crockett, Vermont: The Green Mountain State (1921); Men of Vermont
(Jacob G. Ullery ed., Brattleboro, Vt., Geoge A. Salisbury 1894); Perry H. Merrill,
Vermont Under Four Flags (1975); Earle Newton, The Vermont Story (1949). Finally,
we also consulted materials in the archival collections of John Adams (October 1796–
February 1797), Aaron Burr (October 1796–February 1797), and Alexander Hamilton
(October 1796–February 1797).
59
5 Journals and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of Vermont
1791–1792, at 82–83 (1970) [hereinafter Vermont General Assembly Proceedings]
(“The bill entitled, An Act Directing the Mode of Appointing Electors to Elect a
President and Vice-President of the United States, was read the second time, accepted, and sent to his Excellency and Council for revision and concurrence, or proposals of amendment.”); id. at 87–88 (“The following bills returned from Council concurred, and passed into laws of this State . . . . An Act Directing the Mode of
Appointing Electors to Elect a President and Vice-President of the United States.”).
The statute provides:
An Act Directing the Mode of Appointing Electors to Elect a President and
Vice President of the United States. November 3D, 1791. It is hereby Enacted
by the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, That the Electors for electing a President and Vice President of the United States be appointed by the ballots of the Governor and Council and House of Representatives met in grand
Committee and that those persons to the number which they have right to ap-
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is abundant evidence indicating that this procedure was followed in
1796.60
The distinctive character of the Vermont procedure also refutes
the complaint that the electors were selected through a “resolve”
rather than ordinary legislation. Since Vermont’s Governor cast a
ballot for the electors along with members of his council and the
Vermont House of Assembly, the “Grand Committee” was not an
ordinary legislative body capable of enacting statutes. The Grand
Committee chose electors by means of a “resolve” because it was
specifically delegated this authority by the validly enacted 1791
statute. And finally, it simply is not true that Vermont had violated
the federal statute by selecting its electors before the beginning of
the prescribed thirty-four day period. The records reveal that the
Grand Committee made its choices on November 4, 1796, thirtythree days before “the first Wednesday in December.”61
This was not enough, however, to make the charges unimportant. The newspaper accounts were sufficient to generate a cloud of
suspicion. If the Republicans had chosen to press the issue, it
point who shall have a majority of the votes of said Grand Committee shall be
declared to be duly appointed Electors of this State for the purposes aforesaid.
15 Laws of Vermont 1791–1795, at 43 (1966).
60
7 Vermont General Assembly Proceedings, supra note 59, at 350 (1973) (“On motion of Mr. Farrand, Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor and Council be requested to join the House of Representatives in grand committee tomorrow afternoon, to proceed by ballot to make choice of electors, to elect the president and vicepresident of the United States.”); id. at 354 (“Agreeably to the order of the day, the
Governor, Council and House of Assembly, joined in grand committee for the purpose of proceeding, by ballot, to the choice of electors to elect the president and vicepresident of the United States. . . . The ballots being duly and severally taken, Capt.
Elijah Dewey was declared duly elected, first; Col. Elisha Shelden, second; John
Bridgman, Esq., third; and Oliver Gallup, Esq., fourth; electors to elect the president
and vice-president of the United States.”).
Newspaper reports confirm this. On November 7, The Rutland Herald reported that
“On Friday last the following Gentleman were chosen electors for the choice of a
President for the United States. ELIJAH DEWEY, ELISHA SHELDON, JOHN
BRIDGMAN, and OLIVER GALLUP, E’qr’s.” Rutland Herald (Vermont), Nov. 7,
1796, at 3. On November 17, the Gazette of the United States ran a story under a November 7 Rutland dateline stating that “On Friday last, the following gentlemen were
chosen Electors for the choice of a President for the United States. Elijah Dewey, Elisha Sheldon, John Bridgman, and Oliver Gallup, Esqrs.” Gazette of the United
States (Philadelphia), Nov. 17, 1796, at 3. These are the four names that appear on
Vermont’s electoral vote.
61
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 239, 239; 7 Vermont General Assembly
Proceedings, supra note 59, at 350, 354 (1973).
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would have been difficult for Adams or anybody else to respond
decisively at the time of the vote count. Consider especially the
first of the three complaints—that the original Vermont protocol
was a one-shot regulation designed specifically for the 1792 election, without legal force for 1796. The only way to learn the truth
would have been to send a messenger to Vermont to inspect all the
legislative records, but a round-trip journey to Montpelier would
have taken weeks.62 All sorts of mischief might have been attempted in the meantime.
If the Republicans had raised a formal objection, therefore, Adams would have confronted a very real political problem—but not
an irresolvable one. He could have responded by rejecting the Republicans’ complaint on the basis of a legal presumption. After all,
there was nothing formally defective on the face of Vermont’s electoral documents.63 And so the President of the Senate might announce that the state’s papers were entitled to a presumption of legal regularity that could not be rebutted without a compelling
showing of an underlying substantive problem. This might seem
plausible, but the credibility of such a ruling would have been undercut by Adams’s self-interest in the affair. Whatever he might
say, and however justifiable, his ruling would have eliminated further inquiry into votes that provided his crucial margin of victory.
This would have been a particularly awkward moment for such a
ruling because 1796 marked the first contested presidential election
in the nation’s history. There were warring political parties. If Adams counted himself into the presidency, the Constitution would
be off to a very bad start, even if the country accepted the legitimacy of the outcome.
Only the self-restraint of the Republican leadership permitted
the Constitution to avoid this early test of credibility. Rather than
demagogue the issue, Jefferson self-consciously retired it from public view. The Vermont controversy simmered in the newspapers

62

Clifford L. Lord & Elizabeth H. Lord, Historical Atlas of the United States 79
(1944).
63
There was little doubt, closer to election time, that Vermont wished to cast its
votes for Adams. For example, the South-Carolina State Gazette reported on November 19 that “[t]he Legislature of Vermont choose[s] the Electors for that State. That
they will be true Federalists is undoubted.” South Carolina State Gazette, Nov. 19,
1796.
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throughout December,64 and uncertainty about the Vermont vote
was reflected in the ongoing informal tallies of the electoral vote.
Since Jefferson was at Monticello throughout this period,65 Madison was functioning as the operational leader in Philadelphia and
regularly wrote to his chief for marching orders. His letter of
Christmas Day 1796 begins with the caveat: “I can not yet entirely
remove the uncertainty in which my last [letter] left the election.
Unless the Vermont election of which little has of late been said,
should contain some fatal vice, in it, Mr. Adams may be considered
as the President elect.”66 Jefferson replied on January 16, 1797:
I observe doubts are still expressed as to the validity of the Vermont election. Surely in so great a case, substance & not form
should prevail. I cannot suppose that the Vermont constitution
has been strict in requiring particular forms of expressing the legislative will. As far as my disclaimer may have any effect, I pray
you to declare it on every occasion foreseen or not foreseen by
me, in favor of the choice of the people substantially expressed,
and to prevent the phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so
early a day.67

Jefferson’s words were decisive: The Vermont controversy dropped
from public view during the run-up to the formal vote count on
February 8, with Republican newspapers conceding the victory to
Adams.68
64

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Although Jefferson was a leading contestant for the presidency in 1796, he “remained at Monticello until the twentieth of February; then rode for Philadelphia, arriving on March 2, 1797.” Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson 587 (1964). This
means that he did not witness the vote-counting ritual in February. Indeed, Jefferson
wrote a letter to Madison on January 30 with a Monticello dateline saying that he did
not wish to come to Philadelphia even for the inauguration ceremonies in March (asserting that he need not attend). Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Jan. 30, 1797), in 16 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 479, 479. He evidently changed
his mind later. There is no evidence that he was aware of Adams’s precedent.
66
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 25, 1796), in 16 Madison
Papers, supra note 5, at 435, 435.
67
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461.
68
In the December 21 edition of Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser, the Vermont
votes were reported and a story with a Rutland dateline appeared stating that “[o]n
Wednesday, the electors for the choice of a President and Vice-President of the
United States, met in this town.—We are informed that all their votes were for the
65
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Jefferson’s decision adds some useful complexity to our larger
story. We have stressed how the Framers’ failure to anticipate the
two-party system threatened to throw the constitutional system
into a severe crisis. But Jefferson’s letter suggests that the survival
of classical republican ideals—condemning faction, praising civic
unity—tempered the very crisis that the Framers had failed to anticipate. Both Adams and Jefferson were hardly political innocents,
and they were perfectly prepared to compete for power in the new
partisan environment. Nevertheless, they remained powerfully attracted to the animating spirit of the Founding. When push came to
shove, they sometimes—not always—managed to put these principles into practice in ways that softened the party assault on the
non-party Constitution of 1787.
Jefferson’s January 16 letter was one such instance.69 There can
be no doubt that he was right: The country could ill afford “the
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so early a day.”70

Hon. JOHN ADAMS, and the Hon. THOMAS PINCKNEY, Esqrs.” Greenleaf’s
New Daily Advertiser (New York), Dec. 21, 1796, at 3. On December 22, the Gazette
of the United States and Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser both counted Vermont’s
votes for the Federalists in their electoral vote chart. Gazette of the United States
(Philadelphia), Dec. 22, 1796, at 3; Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York),
Dec. 22, 1796, at 3. The Aurora & General Advertiser from that day ran a story stating
that “[f]rom good authority we are [unreadable word] that the Electors of the State of
Vermont have voted for John Adams and Thomas Pinckney.” Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Dec. 22, 1796, at 2. The editions of the Gazette of the United
States over the next two days counted the Vermont votes, and the same is true of the
December 24, 1796, editions of the Columbian Centinel and Greenleaf’s New Daily
Advertiser. Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Dec. 23, 1796, at 3; Gazette of
the United States (Philadelphia), Dec. 24, 1796, at 3; Columbian Centinel (Boston),
Dec. 24, 1796, at 2; Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), Dec. 24, 1796, at
3.
69
In previous correspondence with Madison, Jefferson had already suggested an
unwillingness to press partisanship too far in an effort to obtain the presidency. His
letter of December 17 contemplated the possibility that some of Adams’s enemies in
the Federalist party might seek to deprive Adams of the electoral votes that were
rightly his, leading to a Jefferson-Adams dead-heat. Once again, Jefferson was explicit in his instructions: “I pray you and authorize you fully to solicit on my behalf
that mr. Adams may be preferred. He has always been my senior from the commencement of our public life, and the expression of the public will being equal, this
circumstance ought to give him the preference.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Dec. 17, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 431, 431–32.
70
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461.
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We will return to this theme in discussing the main subject of this
essay: Jefferson’s use of his power as Senate President to give himself a significant advantage in the Electoral College crisis of 1801.
Before turning to this forgotten story, there is an additional lesson
to be learned from our prelude.
C. Vote-Counting Day in Philadelphia
Without a doubt, most of the suspense had disappeared, but
there was still a potential for intrigue on February 8, 1797, the day
the votes were counted to pick the second President of the United
States. Newspapers had ceased printing stories about the Vermont
votes, but Adams and his supporters could not know for sure
whether the Republicans were planning some last minute tricks.
The stakes were enormous. If the Vermont electors had not been
validly appointed, Adams would lose the state’s four votes and Jefferson would become President by a margin of sixty-eight to sixtyseven.71
The constitutional mathematics raised a strategic question for
Adams: Would he provide his political enemies an explicit procedural opportunity to raise the Vermont matter and its potentially
devastating consequences? Or would he make it as hard as possible
for the Republicans to mount a challenge?
The Annals of Congress describes the proceedings:
The President of the Senate [John Adams] then thus addressed the two Houses:
Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives:
By the report which has been made to me by the tellers appointed by the two Houses to examine the votes, there are 71
votes for John Adams, 68 for Thomas Jefferson, 59 for Thomas
Pinckney, 30 for Aaron Burr, 15 for Samuel Adams, 11 for Oliver
Ellsworth, 7 for George Clinton, 5 for John Jay, 3 for James Iredell, 2 for George Washington, 2 for John Henry, 2 for Samuel
71

If Vermont’s 1791 electoral statute had lapsed, then it had not validly appointed
its four 1796 Electors, leaving only 134 remaining in the pool. Under the Constitution,
this meant that Jefferson’s sixty-eight votes were sufficient for him to prevail without
a runoff. See supra note 50.
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Johnston, and 1 for Charles C. Pinckney. The whole number of
votes are 138; 70 votes, therefore, make a majority; so that the
person who has 71 votes, which is the highest number, is elected
President, and the person who has 68 votes, which is the next
highest number, is elected Vice President.
The President of the Senate then sat down for a moment, and
rising again, thus addressed the two Houses:
In obedience to the Constitution and Law of the United
States, and to the commands of both Houses of Congress, expressed in their resolution passed in the present session, I declare
that
John Adams is elected President of the United States, for
four years, to commence with the fourth day of March next; and
that Thomas Jefferson is elected Vice President of the United
States, for four years, to commence with the fourth day of March
72
next.

“The President of the Senate then sat down for a moment.” Four
years earlier, Vice-President Adams had also presided over the
vote count, but the Annals of Congress contains no similar notation.73 Indeed, no such pause is noted in any of the first fourteen
presidential vote counts. It would seem, then, that Adams’s action
72

6 Annals of Cong. 2097–98 (1797) (second emphasis added). Some of the accounts
of vote-counting day in 1797 simply copy the Annals of Congress report that Adams
sat for a moment. 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress 63 (Thomas Borden ed.,
New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857); Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 15
(reporting proceedings of Feb. 8, 1797); McKnight, supra note 5, at 392; Presidential
Counts, at xxii (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1877). Others are identical in substance to the Annals but provide abbreviated versions, leaving out various details.
These omit any mention of Adams’s momentary pause but do not contradict the fuller
accounts. H. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 685–86 (1797); S. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 320
(1797); Presidential Counts, supra, at 6, 9; Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 9, 1797, at 3.
73
The various accounts of Adams’s conduct in 1793 are briefer than in 1797, and it is
possible that Adams indeed sat for a moment but that this action was not recorded.
Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 10–11; 3 Annals of Cong. 874–75 (1793); H.
Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 701–02 (1793); S. Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 485–86 (1793); 1
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 385–86; McKnight, supra
note 5, at 390–91; Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at xxii, 3. No explicit mention,
however, is made of such behavior.
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was deliberate. Only one previous scholar has explicitly noted this
incident: “Mr. Adams himself could certainly not raise the question
of the validity of the Vermont votes; but he seems to have given an
opportunity for objections if anyone should see fit to raise them.”74
A deflationary interpretation is available—perhaps Adams was
only marking a transition between two phases of the proceeding,
symbolizing that the vote count had concluded and the time had
come for a final and authoritative declaration of the result. Yet this
seems unlikely. Adams was no fool: By sitting down, he was putting himself at the mercy of the Republican opposition in a close
election.75 He would not have paused unless he harbored some
doubts about his authority as President of the Senate to resolve
disputed issues unilaterally.
Thomas Jefferson would take a different view four years later.
III. THE ELECTION OF 1800
When John Adams opened the documents from Vermont in
1797, they were in perfect order. Thomas Jefferson faced a different situation when he opened Georgia’s electoral votes in 1801:
The certificate was illegal on its face. We begin by setting the problem in a larger context before focusing on Jefferson’s response.

74

1 Stanwood, supra note 5, at 52.
There may also have been technical problems with the Kentucky electoral votes in
1797. Several sources state that Adams announced that there was only one copy of
Kentucky’s electoral votes. 6 Annals of Cong. 2096 (1797); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 62; Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 14–
15; McKnight, supra note 5, at 392. After inspection of the National Archives collection of electoral votes, it appears that there are, in fact, duplicate copies of the Kentucky votes in the archives, but perhaps the duplicate was missing on vote-counting
day in 1797.
There was also debate about events in Pennsylvania. Two Jefferson supporters
may have been elected, but their returns were submitted late and two Federalists
presented themselves as the legitimate electors. Letter from Joseph Jones to
James Madison (Dec. 15, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 428, 429
n.1. In the end, it does not appear to have mattered all that much, as one of the
two Federalist electors voted for Jefferson regardless. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to T.M. Randolph (Jan. 9, 1797), in Jefferson Papers 17286–87, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
75
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A. The Run-Up
Washington’s delay in announcing his Farewell Address constrained the ferocity of party competition in 1796. With the Great
Man departing the scene at the end of September, the two sides
had little time to escalate their struggle to fever pitch. Four years
later, partisan battle reached one of its historic highs.76
For both parties, the very future of the republic was at stake. For
the Federalists, the Republicans were vicious factionalists who
sought revolutionary upheaval along Jacobin lines.77 For the Republicans, the Federalists were cryptomonarchists, aping English
models at home and damaging the republican cause abroad.78 Both
sides reacted with extreme measures that testified to their high
anxiety. Republican politicians in Kentucky and Virginia issued
resolutions calling for extraordinary state actions to check the
abuse of Federalist power, while Federalist judges threw Republican newspaper editors into jail for seditious libel.79
As the moment of electoral truth neared, the written Constitution failed to discharge its most basic function. Whatever else it
may or may not accomplish, a written constitution is supposed to
provide everyone with undisputable rules of the game—telling

76

Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109, 111 (“With the exception of the Civil War and the periods immediately preceding and succeeding it[,] . . . America probably has not known
a time when its politics were conducted with such vehemence and hatred.”).
77
See, e.g., Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War 10–12, 28, 41 (1966).
78
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei (Apr. 24, 1796), in 7 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 72, 75–76 (Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1896) (referring to the Federalists as an “Anglican[,] monarchical, & aristocratical party”). A North Carolina newspaper put it this way:
Thomas Jefferson first drew the declaration of American independence;—he
first framed the sacred political sentence that all men are born equal. John Adams says this is all a farce and a falsehood; that some men should be born Kings,
and some should be born Nobles. Which of these, freemen of Pennsylvania, will
you have for your President? Will you, by your votes, contribute to make the
avowed friend of monarchy, President? —or will you, by neglectfully staying at
home, permit others to saddle you with Political Slavery? Adams has Sons who
might aim to succeed their father; Jefferson like Washington has no son. Adams
is a fond admirer of the British Constitution, and says it is the first wonder of
the world. Jefferson likes better our Federal Constitution, and thinks the British
full of deformity, corruption and wickedness. Once more fellow citizens!
Edenton State Gazette of North Carolina, Nov. 24, 1796.
79
This familiar story is well summarized in Weisberger, supra note 40, at 200–24.
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them what they must do to win elections, and how to determine
who has lost. When judged by this key criterion, the Philadelphia
Convention was a miserable failure.
The rise of two-party competition had transformed the Framers’
clever effort at institutional engineering into a constitutional
nightmare. Failing to anticipate the rise of national parties, the
Convention had focused on a different set of problems when designing its system of presidential selection. In the Framers’ estimation, their big problem was state provincialism, and so they had developed their complex two-vote scheme to mitigate its effects.
Despite the impact of political parties on the election of 1796, the
system managed to operate more or less as the Framers envisioned.
With second votes scattering on behalf of regional favorites, the
number-two spot went to Thomas Jefferson, leader of the Republican party but also a “continental character” of the sort they wanted
to guide the nation.
As the 1800 race intensified, though, the electoral system became the object of intense partisan manipulation. On the state
level, parties used their political power to manipulate the process
of selecting electors—shifting to legislative selection, or changing
the mode of popular choice, depending on their perception of partisan advantage.80 The Federalists attempted the same maneuver on
the national level, where they were in firm control of the presidency and both houses of Congress. Under the leadership of Federalist Senator James Ross, the Senate passed a bill establishing a
special committee to “inquire, examine, decide, and report upon”
irregularities that might occur in connection with the electoral
vote.81 This “Grand Committee” was to include six senators, six
representatives, and the Chief Justice of the United States.82 It was

80
81

Tadahisa Kuroda, The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment 72–82 (1994).
Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 18. Such irregularities included:
the constitutional qualifications of the persons voted for as President and VicePresident of the United States, upon the constitutional qualifications of the
electors appointed by the different States, and whether their appointment was
authorized by the State legislature or not; upon all petitions and exceptions
against corrupt, illegal conduct of the electors, or force, menaces, or improper
means used to influence their votes; or against the truth of their returns, or the
time, place, or manner of giving their votes.

Id.
82

Id. at 17.
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to meet in secret83 and its report would serve as the “final and conclusive determination of the admissibility or inadmissibility of the
votes given by the electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States.”84
Passed on a party-line vote of sixteen to twelve in March 1800,
the bill would have become law but for Congressman John Marshall’s intervention in the House. Speaking before a House select
committee,85 Marshall raised constitutional objections to the proposed bill.86 His amendments stripped the Committee of its authoritative status, giving the last word to both houses of Congress, meeting separately. The Committee’s rejection of a state’s electoral vote
would be upheld only if a majority of both houses accepted its recommendation.87 Marshall’s success in weakening the proposal angered the more extreme Federalists. His measure passed the House
but was rejected on another party-line vote in the Senate—with
hard-line Federalists insisting that a Committee rejection be upheld if only one house supported its recommendation.88 This demand led to an impasse, and the Ross initiative came to nothing,
leaving the President of the Senate and Congress to confront the
painfully inadequate constitutional text if a vote-counting problem
should arise.89
83

Id.
Id. at 18.
10 Annals of Cong. 670, 674 (1800).
86
See 2 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 453–57 (1916).
87
10 Annals of Cong. 670, 674; see Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 24;
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 19, 1800, at 2 (reprinting the bill’s
text in full).
88
See 2 Beveridge, supra note 86, at 456; Kuroda, supra note 80, at 80–82.
89
As sitting Vice-President, Jefferson was, of course, an interested observer, and
was unimpressed by Marshall’s efforts to control the Grand Committee:
[T]he bill for the election of the Pres and V P has undergone much revolution.
Marshall made a dexterous manoeuver; he declares against the constitutionality
of the Senate’s bill, and proposes that the right of decision of their grand committee should be controllable by the concurrent vote of the two Houses of congress; but to stand good if not rejected by a concurrent vote. You will readily estimate the amount of this sort of controul. The committee of the H. of R.,
however, took from the Committee the right of giving any opinion, requiring
them to report facts only, and that the votes returned by the states should be
counted, unless reported by a concurrent vote of both Houses. In what form
they will pass them or us, cannot be foreseen.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800) in Jefferson Papers 18274, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html (on file
84
85
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This ticking time-bomb was momentarily forgotten once the
electoral returns started rolling in. In contrast to 1796, electors had
sworn off the practice of substituting a favorite son for their party’s
vice-presidential candidate. With four years of battle under their
belts, every elector voted a straight party-line ticket, with one exception. The Federalists wasted one of their second ballots on John
Jay, giving John Adams a one-vote edge over his running mate
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and neatly avoiding a House runoff
if they won a majority.
The Republicans were less astute. All of their electors voted a
straight ticket, giving Jefferson and Burr an equal number of votes
and throwing the race into the House. “[A]fter the most energetic
efforts, crowned with success, we remain in the hands of our enemies by want of foresight in the original arrangement”90—so wrote
Jefferson to Monroe on December 20.
Almost two months remained before the day designated for the
formal vote count, Wednesday, February 11, 1801.91 This was a period of feverish activity, as Republicans and Federalists prepared
their forces for the looming House runoff between Jefferson and
Burr. If the protagonists had been aware of a problem with Georgia’s electoral votes, they would have engaged in a related round of
strategic maneuvering. Without Georgia’s four electors, Jefferson
and Burr could only claim sixty-nine valid votes apiece. As we have
explained,92 this would have forced them into a five-man runoff
that included Adams, Pinckney, and Jay.93 The possibility of a fiveman race should have provoked an intense round of politicking—
and yet we have found absolutely no documentary evidence of any
such activity. In contrast, there is voluminous evidence detailing efforts by Federalist and Republican politicians to gain support from

with the Virginia Law Review Association). Jefferson seems to have misread Marshall’s bill, which required both houses to uphold the Committee’s decision before a
full rejection could occur. Jefferson asserts that the Committee’s decision would be
valid unless both houses affirmatively rejected their findings.
90
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Dec. 20, 1800), quoted in
Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty 496 (1962). This letter can
be found at the Library of Congress, Jefferson Papers 18511 (available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html).
91
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 5, 1 Stat. 239, 240.
92
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
93
Id.
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House members in the two-man race between Jefferson and Burr
they believed was in the offing.94 The silence about the five-man
possibility is deafening—no one seems to have anticipated the constitutional pitfalls awaiting Jefferson when he opened the ballots
on February 11.
Our conclusion is bolstered by Jefferson’s confident treatment of
an administrative matter. To ensure that all the electoral votes arrived in Washington in time, the governing statutes authorized the
Secretary of State, then John Marshall, to “send a special messenger” if any state’s electoral certificates had not arrived by the “first
Wednesday in January.”95
The states were sending envelopes containing their ballots to
Jefferson, in his capacity as President of the Senate.96 On December 28, he wrote Marshall that no special messengers would be required.97 Jefferson’s confidence was perfectly understandable—as
we will see, the outside of the envelope from Georgia bears no indication of the constitutional problems contained within.98 Moreover, it was perfectly understandable that Jefferson would go no
further than the surface of the envelope, as the Constitution explicitly required him to “open all the Certificates” in full view of the
House and Senate,99 and he would have raised suspicions about ballot-tampering had he taken a peek beforehand.
The emerging situation was the mirror image of the Vermont
scenario of 1797. The complaints about Vermont were raised in the
newspapers long before Adams opened the envelopes.100 This gave
the sitting Vice-President an opportunity to consider in advance
how to conduct himself at the moment of truth. The potential legal
94

Professor Ackerman recounts their scheming at length in a forthcoming book. See
Ackerman, supra note 41, at 60–132.
95
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 4, 1 Stat. 239, 240. (empowering the Secretary of
State to send a messenger to a state only if “a list of votes” had not been received by
the first Wednesday in January).
96
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
97
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Marshall (Dec. 28, 1800), in 6 The Papers
of John Marshall 45, 45–46 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1990) (“I have the honor to
inform you that a list of the votes for President & Vice-president of the US. has come
to my hands from every state of the union; and consequently that no special messenger to any of them need be provided by the department of state.”).
98
See infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
99
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
100
See supra note 54.
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difficulty was made easier by the fact that the Vermont ballot was
formally perfect.101 And strategically, the stakes had been lowered
dramatically when, thanks to Jefferson’s behind-the-scenes intervention, the Republicans were no longer publicly complaining
about the legality of the Vermont votes. When Adams provided his
political enemies with a formal opportunity to protest at the votecounting ritual, he could be quite confident that his enemies would
not exploit the situation, and if they did, that he could legally justify a decision to place the Vermont votes in his column.
Things were different in 1801. When the obvious defect in Georgia’s ballot became evident on February 11, everybody would be in
for a surprise, and high-stakes decisions would be required in a
matter of minutes. Worse yet, the written Constitution served only
to exacerbate the explosive situation. Rather than providing clear
rules for resolving electoral vote problems, it explicitly handed the
gavel to the worst possible presiding officer—the man with the
most to gain by including Georgia’s defective ballot—and failed to
provide him with any rules to govern the tough cases.
B. Jefferson’s Problem
Whatever its other obscurities, Article II of the Constitution
contains some plain instructions for each state’s electors: “And
they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate.”102 Call this the electoral vote, and it is the document that created legal problems for
Georgia in 1800.
A few statutory requirements are also relevant. George Washington’s first election preceded the first session of Congress, but in
1792 Congress enacted a framework law for future contests. The
statute instructs the “executive authority of each state” to create a
second document that certifies the names of the electors who have
been selected by the state.103 Call this the certificate of ascertainment. The statute instructs the electors to enclose this certificate
101

Of course, Adams could not have known this in advance.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
103
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 239, 240.
102
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with their electoral vote.104 Once they have placed both documents
in an envelope for delivery to the President of the Senate, they
must also “certify[]” on the envelope “that a list of the votes of
such state for President and Vice President is contained therein.”105
The Georgia electors fulfilled both of these statutory requirements in 1801, but their electoral vote—the key document required
by the Constitution—dramatically fails to comply with the requirements of Article II and the norms established by the uniform
practice of the states in every early election.106 In 1796, for example,
this is what Georgia’s vote looked like:107

104

Id.
Id. § 2. A further detail: The electors are actually instructed to create three copies
of the relevant documents, and place them in three separate envelopes containing
three superscriptions. One set is personally delivered and one is mailed to the President of the Senate; the third goes to a local federal district judge for safekeeping. Id.
§ 2. Likewise, the state executive is instructed to prepare three copies of the certificate of ascertainment, one copy to be included in each set of electoral documents prepared by the electors. Id. § 3.
106
We have inspected every vote certificate submitted by the state Electors in the
course of the first six elections. With the exception of Georgia’s in 1800, each is in
perfect order. At our request, the Library of Congress has prepared a microform of
these early electoral votes. See Electoral Vote Records, Film. No. 189 (on file with
the Yale Law Library) [hereinafter “Electoral Vote Records”].
The first election, held in 1788, preceded the first session of Congress as well as the
Act of 1792. New Hampshire submitted only the letter from the Electors required by
Article II, with no letter from any “executive authority” as would have been required
by the Act of 1792. Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 239, 240. Two states (Georgia and Maryland) did not send two copies of each item to the Capitol, as would later
be required by the Act of 1792. Id. § 2. But in all other respects, the state documents
fully comply with the rules laid down in the subsequent statute.
107
For those who find the script difficult to decipher, this document states that the
Electors (whose four names appear below) met at a “place directed for the Electors
to meet for the Election of President” and that “We the underwritten Electors do certify the above [four votes for Jefferson and four votes for George Clinton] to be a
true” list of their votes.
105
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Figure 1
As the Constitution prescribes, the upper half of the document
contains “a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of
Votes for each.”108 The bottom half complies with the second part
of the constitutional command: “which List they shall sign and certify.”109 Georgia’s 1796 submission also contains a certificate of as-

108
109

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
Id.
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certainment from the Governor certifying the four electors whose
signatures appear on the electoral vote.110
In contrast, Georgia’s envelope of 1800 contains a single sheet of
paper, not the two provided by every other state. On one side of
the sheet, there is a legally perfect certificate of ascertainment,
signed by Governor James Jackson, identifying the state’s four
electors in the standard fashion. There is, however, no physically
distinct electoral vote. The only indication of the electors’ preferences appears on the obverse side of the certificate of ascertainment. This is what it looks like:

110

We have inspected the original documents at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
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To what extent does this primitive document satisfy the constitutional requirements? If we restrict ourselves to the four corners of
the document, the answer is: not at all. To be sure, there is a “list”
of four names under the headings “Jefferson” and “Burr,” but
there is no statement certifying that the four individuals were casting the state’s electoral votes for these two candidates.
To clarify the formal deficiencies, simply measure the Georgia
“vote” against the terms of the constitutional text. The Georgia
document indeed contains a “List,”111 but it does not say that it
represents a list of “the Persons voted for.”112 The four names appearing below “Jefferson” and “Burr” are those of the individuals
certified by Governor Jackson, but the electors themselves have
not “sign[ed] and certif[ied]” that the list actually represents a true
statement of their preferences.113
These constitutional requirements are purely technical, but they
are not trivial. To the contrary, when read as part of the grander
constitutional scheme, they seem quite important. Immediately after the Constitution imposes elaborate formalisms on each state’s
electoral vote, it proceeds to a provision that should, by now, be
familiar: “The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates,
and the Votes shall then be counted.”114
Given the opacity of this provision, formalism might be just the
thing needed to ensure its smooth operation. Since the text does
not explicitly contemplate complex disputes over the validity of
electoral votes, perhaps the best way to make it operational is to
impose a crisp rule on the President of the Senate. When opening
each ballot, he should assure himself that the voting papers comply
111

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
Id.
113
In the language of Article II and the Act of 1792, the “sign, certify, and transmit”
language is modified by the pronoun “they,” clearly referring to the electors. U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (stating that “they [the electors] shall sign and certify, and
transmit” the electoral votes) (emphasis added); Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1
Stat. 239, 239–40 (stating that the electors “shall make and sign three certificates of all
the votes by them given, and [the electors] shall seal up the same certifying on each
that a list of the votes of such state for President and Vice President is contained
therein”). This makes perfect practical sense—would the Framers or the authors of
the 1792 Act have wanted the electors to draft and certify part of the package and
have some unnamed other complete the process?
114
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
112
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with the formal constitutional and statutory requirements. If they
do, the vote “shall then be counted;”115 if not, it should not. Any
other approach threatens to involve the President of the Senate in
an uncertain proceeding in which he might be an interested party.
The formalist’s premise of a smoothly functioning machine, moreover, was regularly fulfilled during the early years of the republic:
Each state in every prior election had submitted technically perfect
116
electoral votes and certificates of ascertainment.
Yet formalism has the vices of its virtues: The disqualification of
an entire state is a very serious matter. In 1800, Georgia was a frontier region without great legal sophistication.117 If the Georgians
had merely made a technical error in expressing their choice of Jefferson and Burr, would it not be wrong to disqualify them? Worse
yet, the blunder had decisive national ramifications, transforming a
two-man House runoff into a five-man race. Why should the nation’s fate hinge on some backwoods blunder?
But was the mistake merely technical?
Viewing the matter from Washington, D.C., it would have been
hard to know for sure. First of all, no other frontier state had ever
made such a legal mistake. Tennessee, for example, had a much
shorter history of organized government than did Georgia, but it
had had no trouble complying with the explicit commands of the
Constitution and the 1792 Act. Here is Tennessee’s 1800 ballot:118

115

Id.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
117
See infra note 120 and sources cited therein.
118
This document states that:
Pursuant to [their] duty as Electors for the State of Tennessee, having convened
in Knoxville on the first Wednesday of December in the year [one thousand]
eight hundred and being legally qualified, we do certify that we voted by ballot
for President and Vice President of the United States. And upon counting, the
votes they were as follows [three for Jefferson and three for Burr].
The signatures of the electors appear below this statement. Electoral Vote Records,
supra note 106.
116
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Not only did Georgia’s ballot stick out like a sore thumb, but
there was something particularly suspicious about it: Its electoral
vote had been plastered on the backside of the certificate of ascertainment. This anomaly raises the disturbing possibility of a classic
“bait and switch” operation. Under this scenario, Georgia’s four
electors actually did what everybody else did: They prepared a
proper ballot, put it into the envelope with the certificate of ascertainment, and then signed the outside of the envelope.119 At this
point, some devious character enters the scene, removes the standard ballot, and casts four defective votes for Jefferson and Burr
on the backside of the remaining certificate. He then seals the envelope and sends it on its merry way.
The missing electoral document was not only suspicious in itself.
The “bait and switch” scenario put the legal deficiencies of the ersatz ballot in a new and disturbing light. Criminals do not spend
much time reading the Constitution. If a fraudster had removed the
genuine ballot prepared by the true electors, it is not surprising
that he created a legal mess when writing up his counterfeit. On
this scenario, Georgia’s legal mess was the result of a fraudster’s
elimination of the genuine item originally prepared by the true
electors.
Worse yet, Georgia was already notorious for shady dealing. In
the Yazoo scandals, the state’s leading politicians had sold vast
tracts of public land at ridiculously low prices: “[O]nly one of the
legislators voting for [the Yazoo act] had not been bribed in some
way by the land companies.”120 To be sure, Georgia’s voters had re119

The text is simplifying in one particular. Remember that the statute required the
preparation of three sets of documents—two to be delivered to the President of the
Senate and one to a local federal district judge. See supra note 105.
120
C. Peter McGrath, Yazoo 7 (1966). Georgia was very much a frontier state at the
time, without a great deal of legal talent. See generally W.W. Abbot, The Royal Governors of Georgia: 1754–1775 (1959); T.S. Arthur & W.H. Carpenter, The History of
Georgia, from Its Earliest Settlement to the Present Time (Philadelphia, Lippincott,
Grambo & Co. 1852); Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia:
1763–1789 (1958); James F. Cook, The Governors of Georgia: 1754–1995 (1995); 2
Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia (1938); 1 Warren Grice, Georgia Through
Two Centuries (E. Merton Coulter ed., 1966); Amanda Johnson, Georgia as Colony
and State (1938); 2 Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia (Cambridge, The
Riverside Press 1883); Spencer B. King, Jr., Georgia Voices: A Documentary History
to 1872 (1966); Albert B. Saye, New Viewpoints in Georgia History 1732–1789 (1943);
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cently swept the corrupt politicos out of office,121 but could Jefferson, sitting from a great distance in Washington, D.C., be confident
that their replacements were not playing similar games?
So much for the dark side. There were other bits of concrete
evidence that pointed in a more reassuring direction. Pursuant to
statutory instructions, Georgia’s four electors had “certif[ied]” on their
envelope to the President of the Senate “that a list of the votes . . . for
President and Vice President [was] contained therein.”122 As Figure 4
suggests, these four signatures match quite well with their namesakes on the defective ballot illustrated in Figure 2:

George Gillman Smith, The Story of Georgia and the Georgia People: 1732 to 1860
(1900).
121
McGrath, supra note 120, passim.
122
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 239, 239–40.
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Figure 4
The history of mankind is littered with clever forgeries, and even
today, handwriting analysis is more art than science. Nevertheless,
if Jefferson were to compare the ballot with the envelope, he
would not detect evidence of an obvious forgery. So perhaps the
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unconstitutional Georgia ballot was indeed the result of mere legal
incompetence rather than gross skullduggery.
This benign interpretation is supported by a final consideration.
All through January, newspapers were reporting regularly that Jefferson and Burr had won all four of Georgia’s electoral votes.123
Given the broad publicity, surely the Federalists would have
launched a vocal protest if they thought they had really won. The
election of 1800 was one of the closest, and most partisan, in
American history. If any of the Georgia electors had actually voted

123

There were five newspapers in Georgia at the time (the Augusta Chronicle, the
Augusta Herald, the Columbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, the Georgia Gazette, and the Louisville Gazette, the last of which became the Louisville Gazette &
Republican Trumpet in April 1800), and we examined every edition of all five spanning the period of January 1800 to February 1801. We also examined editions of every
newspaper in print anywhere in the country over the period of January to March
1801, as well as every edition of the Gazette of the United States published in 1800.
Our conclusion: In the months leading up to the election, there was some uncertainty about the ultimate result, but as election day neared, the reports consistently
indicated that Georgia would vote for Jefferson and Burr. On May 9, the Columbian
Museum & Savannah Advertiser reported that Georgia would give four votes to
Thomas Jefferson and four votes to Charles Pinckney in the upcoming election. Columbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, May 9, 1800, at 2. On July 22, by contrast,
the same publication reported that Georgia would give four votes each to Thomas
Jefferson and Aaron Burr without explanation. Columbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, July 22, 1800, at 3. On November 8, 1800, the Augusta Herald reported that
Georgia would give four votes to Jefferson, while on November 11, 1800, the Gazette
of the United States reported that Georgia would give two votes to Jefferson, two
votes to Burr, two votes to Adams, and two votes to Pinckney, citing the “Columbian
Mirror” as its source for the report. Augusta Herald, Nov. 8, 1800, at 2; Gazette of the
United States (Philadelphia), Nov. 11, 1800. Four days later, the Gazette reported that
Jefferson would receive four votes and that four votes would be “scattering.” Gazette
of the United States (Philadelphia), Nov. 15, 1800, at 3.
But by November 19, the Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet reported that
“it is now reduced to a certainty, that Mr. Jefferson will get the four votes of this
State, for president,” before repeating the names of the four electors the state legislature apparently picked originally: Morrison, Smelt, Graybill, and Lumpkin. Louisville
Gazette & Republican Trumpet, Nov. 19, 1800, at 3. The Augusta Herald edition for
November 26 repeated this information. Augusta Herald, Nov. 26, 1800, at 3. In its
December 10 edition, the Augusta Herald discussed how each state had voted in the
presidential election, and reported that Georgia had voted for Jefferson. Augusta
Herald, Dec. 10, 1800, at 3. The same day, the Louisville Gazette & Republican
Trumpet reported that “the State of Georgia w[ill] furnish four votes for Jefferson.”
Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet, Dec. 10, 1800, at 1. On December 26, the
Gazette of the United States reported that the “Electors of President and VicePresident in the State . . . [of] Georgia, have given a unanimous vote for Mr. Jefferson
and Mr. Burr.” Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Dec. 26, 1800, at 3.
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for Adams or Pinckney, common sense suggests that they never
would have remained silent as they saw their votes publicly misrepresented. Once the Georgia envelope was opened, clever lawyers
might debate endlessly about the possibility of a “bait and switch”
operation, yet for the sober statesman, the public silence in the period leading up to February 11 might seem more eloquent than
anything lawyers might say afterward.
This final point seems the most powerful argument supporting a
decision to credit Jefferson and Burr with Georgia’s four electoral
votes in 1801. But is it sufficiently powerful to outweigh all the arguments on the other side?
This was the key question facing Jefferson as he confronted his
constitutional responsibilities as Senate President. How did he respond?
C. Jefferson’s Decision
A glance at the official report of the vote count in the Annals of
Congress is not the slightest bit revealing:
Mr. SPEAKER, attended by the House, then went into the
Senate Chamber, and took seats therein, when both Houses being assembled, Mr. RUTLEDGE and Mr. NICHOLAS, the tellers on
the part of this House, together with Mr. WELLS, the teller on
the part of the Senate, took seats at a table provided for them, in
the front of the President of the Senate.
The PRESIDENT of the Senate, in the presence of both
Houses, proceeded to open the certificates of the Electors of the
several States, beginning with the State of New Hampshire; and
as the votes were read, the tellers on the part of each house,
counted and took lists of the same, which, being compared, were
delivered to the President of the Senate, and are as follows:
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12
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73

–
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21
4
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3
8
4
73

6
16
4
9
4

6
16
3
9
4

7
7
3
5

7
7
3
5

4

4

65

64

Recapitulation of the votes of the Electors.
Thomas Jefferson
Aaron Burr John Adams Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
John Jay
-

John Jay.

Charles C. Pinckney.

New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island Connecticut
Vermont
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina Tennessee
South Carolina Georgia
-

John Adams.

STATES.
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Aaron Burr.
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1

1

-

73
73
65
64
1

The PRESIDENT of the Senate, in pursuance of the duty enjoined upon him, announced the state of the votes to both
Houses, and declared that THOMAS JEFFERSON, of Virginia, and
AARON BURR, of New York, having the greatest number, and a
majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, and, being
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equal, it remained for the House of Representatives to determine
the choice.
The two Houses then separated; and the House of Representatives, being returned to their Chamber, proceeded, in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, to the choice of a President of
124
the United States . . . .

There is no indication of a problem with the Georgia ballot. In
contrast to John Adams in 1797, Jefferson does not sit down after
the vote count to give others a chance to raise an objection.125 He
immediately pushes the proceedings to the next stage: a House
runoff between Burr and himself for the presidency. So far as the
Annals and all of the other official versions are concerned, there
was no problem with the Georgia vote.
The newspapers tell a different story. Here is the account from
the Philadelphia Aurora & General Advertiser: “The Tellers declared there was some informality in the votes of Georgia, but believing them to be the true votes, reported them as such.”126 The
Aurora was the leading Republican paper of the time, noteworthy
for its partisanship in a partisan age.127 Since its story cast a shadow
(however slight) on Jefferson’s claim to an Electoral College majority, it certainly would not have fabricated the incident out of
whole cloth.
The Aurora’s report was copied verbatim in Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, and even Savannah, by newspapers of every political
leaning.128 At least one other paper—Boston’s Mercury and New124

10 Annals of Cong. 1023–24 (1801).
None of the reports of Jefferson’s actions from that day indicate that he paused
or sat down. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 30–31, 33; 10 Annals of Cong.
1023 (1801); H. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 796–99 (1801); S. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess.
124–25 (1801); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 531;
McKnight, supra note 5, at 393; Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at xxii, 11, 16.
126
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 11, 1801, at 2.
127
Fischer, supra note 54, at 419 (identifying the Aurora as a “decidedly Republican” newspaper).
128
Columbian Centinel (Boston), Feb. 21, 1801, at 2; Columbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1801, at 3; Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), Feb. 18,
1801, at 2; Philadelphia Gazette & Daily Advertiser, Feb. 14, 1801, at 3; Spectator
(New York), Feb. 18, 1801, at 3. The Centinel and The Philadelphia Gazette & Daily
Advertiser were “decidedly Federalist,” Fischer, supra note 54, at 414, 419. The Spectator and the Pennsylvania Gazette were “moderately Federalist.” Id. at 417, 419. The
125
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England Palladium—published a story that varied the language
slightly: “The votes from Georgia, were rather informal—but accepted.”129 To further enhance verisimilitude, all the newspapers
130
put a precise time on their report: “half past 3 o’clock, p.m.”
No newspaper explicitly described Jefferson’s role in the affair.
Those following the Aurora flashed a searchlight on the “tellers.”
It was these gentlemen, two from the House and one from the Senate, who “declared [that] there was some informality . . . but believing them to be the true votes, reported them as such.”131
As a constitutional matter, however, the tellers lacked the authority to make a binding decision. Article II does not mention
their existence, let alone vest them with any decisionmaking authority.132 Moreover, the official proceedings did not give the last
word to the tellers, but to Jefferson:
The PRESIDENT of the Senate, in pursuance of the duty enjoined upon him, announced the state of the votes to both
Houses, and declared that THOMAS JEFFERSON, of Virginia, and
AARON BURR, of New York, having the greatest number, and a
majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, and, being
equal, it remained for the House of Representatives to determine
the choice.133

Columbian Museum and Savannah Advertiser was “very moderately Federalist.” Id.
at 422. Again, the Aurora was “decidedly Republican.” Id. at 419.
129
Mercury & New-England Palladium (Boston), Feb. 24, 1801, at 2.
130
See supra notes 127–28.
131
See supra notes 126, 128.
132
A bill introduced on February 14, 1800, attempted to define the duties of the tellers, granting them strictly ministerial authority:
[T]o receive the certificates of the Electors from the President of the Senate, after they shall have been opened and read, and to note in writing, the dates of
the certificates, the names of the Electors, the time and place of their meeting,
the number of votes given, and the names of the persons voted for; and also, the
substance of the certificates from the Executive authority of each state, accompanying the certificates of the Electors . . . .
A Bill Prescribing the mode of deciding disputed elections of President and Vice
President of the United States, S., 6th Cong. (1800), microformed on 6th Congress,
1799–1801: Senate Bills (Library of Congress). For reference to the date of introduction, see Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 16; S. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess.,
23, 31 (1800). In any event, it failed to pass Congress. Kuroda, supra note 80, at 78–82.
133
10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801) (emphasis added).
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We are now in a position to present a stripped-down version of our
story:
Strong evidence demonstrates that the tellers told Jefferson (ap134
parently loud enough for the news to get out to the public ) that
there was a problem with the Georgia vote. Our inspection of the
original documents tells us that they were right. Nevertheless, Jefferson asserted his authority, as President of the Senate, to proceed in
the face of this report. He decisively resolved the issue by counting
Georgia’s vote as part of the final tally, even though he was an interested party in the affair. Despite the extraordinary character of this
action, nobody rose to protest.135

If we limit ourselves to strictly contemporaneous sources, this is
all we are entitled to say—more than enough, as we shall see, to
raise a host of historiographic and constitutional issues. Before
broadening the inquiry, we trace the remarkable fate of this incident in American history. After all, it is no small thing to learn that
Thomas Jefferson counted his rivals out of the race in the House
runoff for the presidency. This remarkable fact, however, has
somehow eluded the devoted attentions of generations of Jefferson
lovers and Jefferson haters.136 And it would have eluded our atten134

McKnight describes the likely behavior of the tellers: “We all know that the custom of the tellers at a meeting is for one to count out aloud the votes as they are given
and for the others to record them; this is undoubtedly what they did here on this extraordinary and unique occasion.” McKnight, supra note 5, at 292. Other sources also
indicate that the tellers read the votes aloud. The analytical introduction to Presidential Counts states that “[i]n practice, the tellers have read the votes, one by one, after
they have been opened or the seals sometimes broken, sometimes unbroken, by the
presiding officer, or in some instances the packages with unbroken seals handed over
by the presiding officer.” Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at xiii.
135
These conclusions about the order of events are based on an extensive review of
all available accounts of vote-counting day from the first election up through that of
1840, including (1) Annals of Congress (vote-counting day from 1789–1821); (2) Journal of the House of Representatives (vote-counting day from 1789–1817); (3) Journal
of the Senate (vote-counting day from 1789–1817); (4) Abridgment of the Debates of
Congress (vote-counting day from 1789–1801 and 1809–1841); (5) Gales & Seaton’s
Register of Debates in Congress (vote-counting day from 1825–1833); and (6) Counting Electoral Votes (vote-counting day from 1789–1841). Our survey extended to
various secondary sources, including Dougherty, supra note 5; McKnight, supra note
5; Stanwood, supra note 5; and Presidential Counts, supra note 72.
136
See, e.g., John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 Pol. Sci. Q. 633
(1888); C.C. Tansill, supra note 5. There is only one scholar whose writing suggests
that he may have examined the actual electoral documents in the National Archives.
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tion as well, except for the serendipitous discovery of a remarkable
book by Matthew Livingston Davis.137 Written in 1836, Davis’s twovolume Memoirs of Aaron Burr contains a graphic description of
the scene:
On the 11th of February the ballots were opened. During the
performance of this ceremony a most extraordinary incident occurred. As it is known to but few now living, and never been publicly spoken of, it has been deemed proper to record it here, as a
part of the history of that exciting contest.
The Aurora of the 16th of February, 1801, remarks, that “the
tellers declared that there was some informality in the votes of
Georgia; but, believing them to be true votes, reported them as
such.” No explanation of the nature of this informality was given;
nor is it known that any has ever been given since.
....
. . . Mr. Jefferson was the presiding officer. On opening the
package [of] endorsed Georgia votes, it was discovered to be totally irregular. The statement now about to be given is derived
from an honourable gentleman, a member of Congress from the
state of New-York during the administration of Mr. Jefferson,
and yet living in this state. He says that Mr. Wells (a teller on the
part of the Senate) informed him that the envelope was blank;

He does not, however, mention the legal problems with the Georgia vote, perhaps because he is not a lawyer. Kuroda, supra note 80, at 202 n.48 (1994) (including a citation to the actual Georgia electoral votes of 1800). None of the biographies of Jefferson or studies of the 1800 presidential election mentions the February 11 incident. We
searched a multitude of Jefferson biographies available at the Library of Congress,
and none of them contain any references to the incident. See, e.g., Joyce Appleby,
Thomas Jefferson (2003); Alen Axelrod, Life and Work of Thomas Jefferson (2001);
Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (1996); Dumas
Malone, Jefferson and His Time (1948); Dumas Malone, Thomas Jefferson as Political Leader (1963); Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (1951); Weisberger, supra note 40.
137
Not entirely serendipitous: Professor Ackerman was preparing to write a book on
the constitutional implications of the Jeffersonian “Revolution of 1800,” and was systematically researching the biographies of the leading protagonists in the struggle. See
Ackerman, supra note 41. There are lots of biographies of lots of protagonists, however, and it would have been easy to have missed the reference in a single tome.
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that the return of the votes was not authenticated by the signatures of the electors, or any of them, either on the outside or the inside of the envelope, or in any other manner; that it merely stated
in the inside that the votes of Georgia were, for Thomas Jefferson four, and for Aaron Burr four, without the signature of any
person whatsoever. Mr. Wells added, that he was very undecided
as to the proper course to be pursued by the tellers. It was, however, suggested by one of them that the paper should be handed
to the presiding officer, without any statement from the tellers
except that the return was informal; that he consented to this arrangement under the firm conviction that Mr. Jefferson would
announce the nature of the informality from the chair; but, to his
utmost surprise, he (Mr. Jefferson) rapidly declared that the
votes of Georgia were four for Thomas Jefferson and four for
Aaron Burr, without noticing their informality, and in a hurried
manner put them aside, and then broke the seals and handed to
the tellers the package from the next state. Mr. Wells observed,
that as soon as Mr. Jefferson looked at the paper purporting to
contain a statement of the electoral vote of the state of Georgia,
his countenance changed, but that the decision and promptitude
with which he acted on that occasion convinced him of that
which he (a federalist) and his party had always doubted, that is
to say, Mr. Jefferson’s decision of character, at least when his
own interest was at hazard.138

How much weight should be given to this astonishing account?
On its face, it is double hearsay. Davis heard the account from
an anonymous New York Congressman who had heard it from
Wells. There were three tellers at the proceedings: Federalist William Wells from the Senate, Federalist John Rutledge, and Republican John Nicholas from the House. Our search of the principal
archives containing Davis’s papers, and those of the tellers, has
failed to uncover further corroboration.139 Worse yet, Davis was a
138

2 Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr with Miscellaneous Selections from
His Correspondence 71–73 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1836).
139
Senator Wells’s papers are located at the Historical Society of Delaware in Wilmington, Delaware and at the University of Pennsylvania. Representative Nicholas’s
papers are located at Columbia University, the Library of Congress, and the University of Virginia. Representative Rutledge’s papers are located at Duke University, the
Library of Congress, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. See also
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long-time Burr loyalist and an active and life-long Jeffersonhater.140 During his moderately successful career in New York politics, he certainly did not have a standout reputation for integrity.141
When publishing a posthumous selection of Burr’s papers, he
aimed to put his hero in the best light, sometimes destroying or
altering originals for this greater good.142
Nevertheless, Davis is sometimes careful in his treatment of
sources. While he excludes Burr’s love letters from his book, he is
scrupulous enough to announce the omission in his Preface143—a

Robert K. Ratzlaff, John Rutledge, Jr., South Carolina Federalist, 1766–1819 (1982)
(summarizing Rutledge’s political life); Patrick J. Furlong, John Rutledge, Jr., and the
Election of a Speaker of the House in 1799, 24 Wm. & Mary Q., 3d ser., 432 (1967) (reproducing a letter written by Rutledge). Jefferson’s papers are scattered, but most are
now online, and all are indexed at the Library of Congress. Davis’s papers are located at
the New York Historical Society.
We also searched archival collections for John Adams, Aaron Burr, Alexander
Hamilton, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Nicholas, Wilson Cary Nicholas, Charles Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, John Rutledge, Jr.,
and Samuel Smith.
140
Davis was sharply critical of Jefferson’s victory in 1800. See Letter from Matthew
L. Davis to Albert Gallatin (Jan. 2, 1801), in Matthew Livingston Davis Papers (New
York Historical Society); Letter from Matthew L. Davis to Edward P. Livingston
(Feb. 4, 1804), in Matthew Livingston Davis Papers (New York Historical Society).
He frequently criticized Jefferson for his “lack of good character” and “unethical impulses.” See id. His strong partisanship was undoubtedly sharpened when Jefferson
rejected Burr’s nomination of Davis to the lucrative position of naval officer for the
New York City Custom House. See Howard Lee McBain, De Witt Clinton and the
Origin of the Spoils System in New York 140–44, reprinted in 28 Studies in History,
Economics and Public Law 1 (1907).
141
Mushkat, supra note 52, at 107 (“Davis, as most historians view him, was a man
who could never resist a shady deal or a dishonest dollar, a man whose political acumen was constantly available for sale to the highest bidder.”).
142
Professor Mushkat notes that Davis “destroyed many letters that he considered
damaging, altered others, and generally operated on the premise that future generations had no right to know the real Aaron Burr.” Id.; see also Worthington C. Ford,
Some Papers of Aaron Burr, 29 Proc. Am. Antiquarian Soc’y 43, 44–45 (1919) (“[T]he
righteous indignation of every student of the Burr period is fittingly directed against
[Davis]. To dip casually into a collection and select almost accidentally a few papers
would be a procedure to shame a modern investigator . . . . He took unpardonable
liberties with the text of some which he did print.”).
143
Here is his statement:
It is a matter of perfect notoriety, that among the papers left in my possession
by the late Colonel Burr, there was a mass of letters and copies of letters written or received by him, from time to time, during a long life, indicating no very
strict morality in some of his female correspondents. These letters contained
matter that would have wounded the feelings of families more extensively than
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punctilio that other editors of the era would have considered unnecessary. A similar candor marks his report of the vote-counting
episode of 1801. He does not puff up the truth value of his account,
but clearly states that it is double hearsay, leaving it up to the
reader to assess its ultimate validity.144 What is more, Davis did not
create the story out of whole cloth. The Aurora does say what he
says it says145 and, most crucially, our inspection of the original
documents in the National Archives confirms the key fact that the
Georgia ballot was legally defective, and blatantly so.
Davis goes beyond our contemporaneous sources in one important particular. While the newspapers focus on the tellers’ public
announcement of Georgia’s deficiency, Davis highlights Jefferson’s
aggressive action to preempt further consideration of the matter.
Should we believe Davis on this point?
Perhaps the final answer is tucked away in some forgotten archive. Until some lucky researcher hits pay-dirt, it certainty will
elude us. Moreover, Davis’s hearsay report does contain errors on
other matters. While Federalist Senator William Wells was indeed
the teller designated by the Senate, he did not discover that “the
envelope was blank; that the return of the votes was not authenticated by the signatures of the electors, or any of them, either on the
outside or the inside of the envelope, or in any other manner.”146 As
Figure 2 demonstrates, the electors did sign their names, as required by statute, on the outside of the envelope.147 Davis is also incorrect in asserting that the Georgia ballot “merely stated in the inside that the votes of Georgia were, for Thomas Jefferson four, and

could be imagined. Their publication would have had a most injurious tendency, and created heartburnings that nothing but time could have cured.
As soon as they came under my control I mentioned the subject to Colonel
Burr; but he prohibited the destruction of any part of them during his lifetime. I
separated them, however, from other letters in my possession, and placed them
in a situation that made their publication next to impossible, whatever might
have been my own fate.
1 Davis, supra note 138, at v.
144
Davis states that he edited Burr’s papers “with the most scrupulous regard to
[his] own reputation for correctness.” Id. According to Davis, the Burr Memoirs
“stated facts, and the fair deductions from them, without the slightest intermixture of
personal feeling.” Id.
145
Aurora & General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 16, 1801, at 2.
146
2 Davis, supra note 138, at 72.
147
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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for Aaron Burr four, without the signature of any person whatsoever.”148 As we have seen, the paper does contain signatures, but
the signatories do not specify that they are casting an electoral ballot, much less certify their ballot by the standard method.
It is easy to make too much of such discrepancies, which often
afflict hearsay reports as they proceed from one speaker to the
next. As Senator Wells’s report moved to an anonymous Congressman and then to Davis, some noise entered the signal, but not
to the point of overwhelming the basic story: Georgia’s ballot was
obviously defective. And if this much of the message came
through, one should hesitate before dismissing the further report of
Jefferson’s explicit ruling.
After all, the Constitution delegated to Jefferson, and only Jefferson, an affirmative role in the vote-counting ritual.149 While it is
debatable whether the text gave him the authority to make a decisive ruling, it is abundantly clear that the tellers had absolutely no
authority to resolve the matter, and it was perfectly logical for
them to relieve themselves of the decisional burden by handing the
ballot to Jefferson. Once they had done so, no responsible presiding officer would have proceeded without examining the suspect
ballot papers. Davis’s report, while melodramatic, comports with
the common sense of the situation.150
148

2 Davis, supra note 138, at 72.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of
the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall
then be counted.”) (emphasis added).
150
A final detail of Davis’s account requires separate consideration. He says that,
after hurriedly counting the Georgia vote into the Republican column, Jefferson
“handed to the tellers the package from the next state.” 2 Davis, supra note 138, at 73.
It is possible (though not likely), however, that Georgia’s envelope was opened last.
The electoral votes were not counted in state alphabetical order. Instead, a peculiar
geographic ordering had become customary. In 1797, for example, John Adams began
in the South with Tennessee and worked his way northward. Counting Electoral
Votes, supra note 5, at 12–13; S. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1797); 2 Abridgment
of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 62–63; Presidential Counts, supra note
72, at 9. In 1801, Jefferson began with New Hampshire and worked his way southward. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 30, 33; 10 Annals of Cong. 1023–24
(1801); H. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 796–98 (1801); S. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 124–25
(1801); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72; Presidential Counts,
supra note 72, at xxii, 11, 16.
Georgia might be deemed the southernmost state on some reckonings, thereby suggesting that its envelope would have been opened last. Georgia’s votes were counted
last, after South Carolina’s, in 1793. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 10; H.
149
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What is more, we have uncovered another evidentiary source
testifying to Jefferson’s involvement. Apparently, his decisive action was memorable enough to survive as an oral tradition in Congress as late as 1876, when Senator Hannibal Hamlin recalled the
event:
[T]here was no certificate accompanying the return that the Electors met and balloted. It had nothing on its face to show that the
votes were given for anybody. Clearly it did not conform to the
Constitution, but it was counted as shown by the record.
There was a tradition that the tellers handed it back to Mr.
Jefferson, who returned it to them, and decided that it must be
151
counted.

In contrast to Davis, Hamlin reports the details surrounding
Georgia’s ballot with perfect accuracy. Despite the passage of seventy-five years, he says—correctly—that the Georgia envelope
contained a certificate of ascertainment, but that the ballot “had
nothing on its face to show that the votes were given for anybody.”152 His invocation of “tradition” seems to go back to a source
that is independent of Davis.
Of course, these two post-1801 sources contribute their confirming testimony thirty-five and seventy-five years after the fact. Nev-

Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 702 (1793); S. Jour., 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 485 (1793); McKnight,
supra note 5, at 390–91. But in 1797, all reports except one indicate that Georgia was
counted third (after Tennessee and Kentucky). Counting Electoral Votes, supra note
5, at 13; 9 S. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1797). But see H. Jour., 4th Cong., 2d Sess.
686 (1797) (listing Georgia last). In 1805, Georgia was counted before Tennessee,
Kentucky, and Ohio (which had not been in the Union for the 1800 election), and occupied this position for quite a while. Counting Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 36; 14
Annals of Cong. 1195 (1805); H. Jour., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1805); S. Jour., 8th
Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1805); Presidential Counts, supra note 72, at 19, 21.
Accounts dealing with February 11, 1801, disagree on the order of voting. Several
sources list Georgia last in the state-by-state vote graphs. Counting Electoral Votes,
supra note 5, at 30; 10 Annals of Cong. 1023 (1801); S. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 125
(1801); 2 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, supra note 72, at 531; Presidential
Counts, supra note 72, at 11, 16. Yet others place it third-to-last, followed by Kentucky and Tennessee. H. Jour., 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 799 (1801); Stanwood, supra note
5, at 63. This placement is more consistent with Georgia’s treatment in the immediately preceding and succeeding electoral counts.
151
McKnight, supra note 5, at 293.
152
Id.
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ertheless, modern historians have entirely failed to take it into account, allowing the entire episode to fall out of sight and mind for
more than a hundred years.153
Our story is constructed out of three categories of material. Official documents demonstrate the illegality of the Georgia ballot, and
that counting them was necessary in pushing the electoral vote totals for Jefferson and Burr beyond the crucial threshold of seventy
votes. They also reveal that Jefferson, “in pursuance of the duty
enjoined upon him” as President of the Senate,154 expressly found
that he and Burr had gained “a majority of the votes of all the
Electors appointed.”155 Only on this basis did he send the matter to
“the House of Representatives to determine the choice”156 for
President in a runoff limited to two, rather than five, candidates.
Contemporaneous newspaper reports establish that Jefferson did
not make his decision inadvertently, but that the tellers clearly and
publicly announced the defect in the Georgia vote. Subsequent
hearsay accounts confirm that Jefferson made a focused and selfconscious decision about the Georgia ballot, and resolved the question in a manner that dramatized the intrinsic weakness of the
Founding design.
But enough detective work. The next Part considers the larger
constitutional significance of the Georgia episode. We examine this
question on two fronts: first putting Jefferson’s decision in its concrete historical context, and then considering its enduring implications as a precedent for future Electoral College disputes.
IV. JEFFERSON IN CONTEXT
So the Founders made some serious mistakes, as did Thomas
Jefferson. Constitutional muckraking isn’t much the fashion in
these hagiographic times, but it is tough to ignore some embarrassing questions: Surely the Framers should have been clever enough
to note the danger of appointing the fox to superintend the chicken
coop? Surely Jefferson should have been more up-front about ex-

153

See supra notes 5, 136.
10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801).
Id.
156
Id.
154
155
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cluding his Federalist rivals from the House runoff on the basis of a
transparently defective ballot?
And yet, there is another side to our story. Placed in a greater
historical context, Jefferson’s decision may come to seem something more than a sorry tale of shabby self-dealing. Difficult though
it may be to believe, Jefferson may have chosen the most statesmanlike way out of an impossible situation.
There are even extenuating circumstances surrounding the initial
blunder by the Founders: It was stupid to place the President of the
Senate in the chair, but the outcome in 1801 might well have been
worse had the Founders made a different institutional choice in
1787. Or so we shall argue.
A. Substance Over Form
Begin by recalling Jefferson’s response to the controversy swirling around the Vermont ballot in 1796. Adams was a mere three
votes ahead, and Vermont’s total of four represented his margin of
victory. Nevertheless, Jefferson refused to quibble his way into the
presidency. Remember his words to Madison: “Surely in so great a
case, substance & not form should prevail. . . . I pray you to declare
it on every occasion foreseen or not foreseen by me, in favor of the
choice of the people substantially expressed, and to prevent the
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so early a day.”157
Jefferson’s self-restraint in 1797 casts new light on his apparent
self-dealing in 1801. Perhaps he was acting, in both cases, on the
same principle: do not allow legal quibbling to produce “the
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president” not rooted in the “choice of
the people.” In 1797, this principle meant supporting Adams; in
1801, himself.
But, of course, this recharacterization begs a substantial question: How could Jefferson be so sure that the defect in Georgia’s
ballot was merely formal, and not the result of fraudulent misrepresentation?
The question turns primarily on the weight properly accorded a
single fact: During the final run-up to the vote count, Georgia’s
votes for Jefferson and Burr seemed a foregone conclusion. News157

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461.
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papers around the country were regularly placing them in the Republican column without controversy.158 Nobody in Washington
had made any contrary suggestions. Given the ferocity of partisan
combat at the time and the closeness of the election, the deafening
silence had a plain meaning: No smoke equals no fire. For a man of
the world—and Jefferson was nothing if not a man of the world—
there was an obvious inference. If the Federalists weren’t complaining, then there was nothing to complain about. Despite the
formal deficiencies, Georgia’s votes should count in the Republican column, with form giving way to substance.
Of course, Jefferson’s judgment call may have been wrong, and
one of us has traveled to Georgia on a factfinding mission to explore the matter further.159 Our conclusion: The state’s four electors
indisputably voted for Jefferson and Burr, “to the great satisfaction
of a large concourse of people assembled on the occasion.”160 This
report by Governor Jackson is abundantly confirmed in local

158

See supra note 123.
Our review included an examination of the following materials: (1) the papers of
eight of the most prominent Georgia political figures of the period (Georgia Historical Society, Savannah) (additionally, each of the other collections was searched for
papers concerning these eight personalities); (2) every edition of every Georgia newspaper from January 1800 to February 1801 (University of Georgia Hargrett Library
for Rare Books and Manuscripts, Athens); (3) records of the Georgia Senate and the
Georgia House of Representatives for 1799 and 1800; and (4) a book containing the
Governor’s outgoing official correspondence covering the period between January
1799 and March 1801 (Georgia Department of Archives and History, Atlanta). A
broad range of secondary literature was also examined. See supra note 120 and
sources cited therein; see also E. Merton Coulter, Abraham Baldwin: Patriot, Educator, and Founding Father (1987); William Omer Foster, Sr., James Jackson: Duelist
and Militant Statesman (1960); Harvey H. Jackson, Lachlan McIntosh and the Politics
of Revolutionary Georgia (1979); George R. Lamplugh, Politics on the Periphery:
Factions and Parties in Georgia, 1783–1806 (1986); Walter McElreath, A Treatise on
the Constitution of Georgia (1912); Albert Berry Saye, A Constitutional History of
Georgia: 1732–1968 (1970); E. Merton Coulter, Edward Telfair, 20 Ga. Hist. Q. 99
(1936); Patrick J. Furlong, Abraham Baldwin: A Georgia Yankee as Old Congressman, 56 Ga. Hist. Q. 51 (1972); George R. Lamplugh, George Walton, Chief Justice
of Georgia, 1783–1785, 65 Ga. Hist. Q. 82 (1981); George R. Lamplugh, “Oh the Colossus! The Colossus!”: James Jackson and the Jeffersonian Republican Party in
Georgia, 1796–1806, 9 J. Early Republic 315 (1989); Edwin Bridges, George Walton:
A Political Biography (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago)
(on file with the University of Chicago Library).
160
Letter from Governor James Jackson to Abraham Baldwin (Dec. 5, 1800), in
Abraham Baldwin Papers (University of Georgia at Athens).
159
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newspapers.161 There is no question about it: If Georgia’s votes had
not been counted in Washington, form would have indeed triumphed over substance.
We have been less successful in finding out why the Georgians
failed, on this one occasion, to comply with constitutional rules
consistently followed elsewhere. It is clear, however, that the
Georgians had been particularly inattentive to federal requirements during the 1800 campaign. At an earlier stage, the legislature
had passed a statute providing for the selection of electors as part
of the general election scheduled in early October.162 In taking this
step, it violated a federal law requiring all states to pick their electors “within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December.”163 When the bill reached Governor Jackson’s desk, he
identified the legal problem and vetoed the plan.164 The legislature
then refused to hold an additional election within the thirty-fourday window, and chose to select the four electors itself.165
161

On November 19, the Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet reported that
“[i]t is now reduced to a certainty that Mr. Jefferson will get the four votes in this
state for president.” Louisville Gazette & Republican Trumpet, Nov. 19, 1800, at 3.
Reports that Georgia voted for Jefferson and Burr appear in various editions of the
Augusta Herald and the Georgia Gazette. Augusta Herald, Dec. 13, 1800, at 3; Augusta Herald, Dec. 27, 1800, at 2; Augusta Herald, Jan. 3, 1801, at 3; Augusta Herald,
Jan. 17, 1801, at 2; Augusta Herald, Jan. 28, 1801, at 2; Georgia Gazette, Jan. 8, 1801,
at 3.
162
Journal of the Ga. S. 29 (Nov. 30, 1799).
163
Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 239, 239.
164
Journal of the Ga. S. 39 (Dec. 5, 1799); see also Augusta Herald, Nov. 5, 1800, at
3 (referencing this problem with the proposed law). We have been unable to identify
any Georgia law enacted before 1800 that regulated the selection of presidential electors.
165
Journal of the Ga. H.R. 62–63 (Nov. 5, 1800); Journal of the Georgia Senate 7–8
(Nov. 5, 1800). On November 18, both houses of the Georgia state legislature met and
picked John Morrison, Dennis Smelt, Henry Greybill, and John Lumpkin as presidential electors. Journal of the Ga. H. R. 81 (Nov. 18, 1800); Journal of the Ga. S. 25
(Nov. 18, 1800).
There is another ambiguity. David Blackshear cast one of the electoral votes from
Georgia, but he was not chosen as one of the original electors. On November 18—the
day the state legislature picked Smelt, Morrison, Greybill and Lumpkin—Governor
Jackson may have discovered that Lumpkin could not serve due to family illness, and
he may have appointed Blackshear in Lumpkin’s place. In the Abraham Baldwin Papers, there is an official gubernatorial document (complete with seal) that mentions
the “executive appointment of David Blackshear as an Elector for President and Vice
President in the room of John Lumpkin.” James Jackson, Gubernatorial Statement
(Nov. 18, 1800), in Abraham Baldwin Papers (University of Georgia at Athens). The
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Unfortunately, the Governor was not equally vigilant when the
electors assembled before a “large concourse” to cast their ballots.
Nobody intervened to correct Georgia’s legal error, but there was
no doubt about the underlying intent of the electors.166 Jefferson
was on solid ground in refusing to make a federal case out of frontier ineptitude.
B. Prudence and Publicity
But Jefferson did not merely place Georgia’s votes into the Republican column; he did not publicly acknowledge the existence of
any sort of problem. In contrast to John Adams four years earlier,
he did not give his opponents a clear opportunity to raise the issue.
Instead, he immediately proceeded to cut his Federalist opponents
out of the runoff.167 Although Jefferson’s decision turned out to be
substantively sound, surely it was procedurally defective?
Perhaps not. Though Jefferson did not speak, the tellers announced the existence of the problem before handing him the
Georgia document, and loud enough for the newspapers to carry
the story throughout the land.168 Two of the three tellers were Federalists, and one of them—if Davis is to be believed—was shocked
by Jefferson’s rapid disposition of the affair.169 He certainly was in a
position to stop the vote count and raise a formal objection if he
chose, but he did not do so.
There is every reason to suppose that the Georgia delegation
was among the members of the House and Senate whose “presence” is constitutionally required at the vote-counting ceremony.
Two of these Georgians—Benjamin Taliaferro of the House and

University of Georgia archival staff seems to have dated this document November 18,
but the document itself states that the Governor “caused the great seal of the said
State to be put and affixed at the State House in Louisville this tenth day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred.” Id. We think the later date
is more plausible, especially since the Governor’s outgoing correspondence book contains a letter addressed to Lumpkin and the other three electors dated November 19,
1800. Letter to Dennis Smelt, John Morrison, Henry Gr[e]ybill, and John Lumpkin
(Nov. 19, 1800), in Governor’s Letter Book of Gov. James Jackson: March 25, 1800–
March 2, 1801, at 141 (Ga. Dep’t of Archives and History) (1940).
166
See supra note 123.
167
10 Annals of Cong. 1023–24 (1801).
168
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
169
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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James Gunn of the Senate—had been elected as Federalists.170
Surely one or another would have protested if he believed that the
electors had actually voted a Federalist ticket. No intense partisanship was required to raise this point had it been well founded.
It is wrong, then, to accuse Jefferson of exploiting his position to
keep his opponents in the dark. His official silence helped conceal
his ruling from posterity, but the Georgia problem was not a secret
to the assembled congressmen. Jefferson had simply shifted the
burden of going forward to the Federalists in the audience. If they
wished to create a “Pseudo-president” by raising some legal quibbles, it was up to them to make a clear and focused objection. Jefferson certainly was not going to do anything to make their task
any easier.171
Jefferson’s silence seems particularly sensible in the context of
the confused legal situation prevailing in 1801. Just the year before,
Congress tried to pass a statute creating an explicit procedure for
dealing with electoral vote challenges,172 but it failed to achieve
consensus,173 leaving everybody with the painfully ambiguous words
of the Constitution as a guide. The text simply does not specify
who is to have the last word. Though the President of the Senate
170

Professor Dauer has Taliaferro listed as a Federalist. Dauer, supra note 5, at 323.
The other member of the House of Representatives besides the Federalist Taliaferro,
James Jones, had died before vote-counting day, but he was also a Federalist. Id.
Senator Gunn, present on vote-counting day, was a Federalist. See Gunn, James,
1753-1801, at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000526 (last
visited Jan. 30, 2004) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). A book that
provides information on all senators from Georgia does not list Gunn’s partisan affiliation, but does say that he engaged in a duel with arch-Republican Georgia Governor and Senator James Jackson. Josephine Mellichamp, Senators from Georgia 23
(1976).
171
The principle of passivity established by Jefferson remains in force today. Under
rules established by the Electoral Vote Count Act of 1887, the chair does not raise
any questions regarding the legitimacy of electoral votes. Rather, a protest must be
signed by at least one representative and one senator before its consideration will be
in order. It should also be noted, however, that the Act requires the Senate President
to apprise the assembled individuals of their opportunity to raise challenges. 3 U.S.C.
§ 15 (2000) (“Upon such reading of any such certificate or paper, the President of the
Senate shall call for objections, if any. Every objection shall be made in writing, and
shall state clearly and concisely, and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall
be signed by at least one senator and one member of the House of Representatives
before the same shall be received.”).
172
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
173
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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“opens” the votes, he is not expressly authorized to do more;
though vote counting occurs in the “presence” of the two houses,
they are not expressly granted any sort of decisionmaking authority, let alone decisive power.174
Jefferson’s silence allowed everybody to resolve the matter
without a heated legalistic battle. And there can be no question
that the battle would have been heated. The Federalists had a clear
majority in Congress.175 This gave them an overwhelming interest in
stretching the constitutional language to give the final word to the
House and Senate; while Jefferson, outraged by the partisan theft
of four crucial votes, would have had every incentive to insist upon
an expansive reading of his own power to “open” the votes.
As the parties struggled in legal limbo, they would soon confront
another danger. There was no obvious method by which to resolve
their argument. They would be facing an infinite regress: On the
one hand, the President of the Senate could claim the right to decide whether the President of the Senate possessed the contested
power; and on the other, senators and representatives might insist
that their “presence” at the vote count authorized them to override
the President’s ruling.
Worse yet, dispatching a factfinding mission to Georgia was not
feasible. It was the dead of winter, and a snowstorm was swirling
around the half-built Capitol.176 Even during calmer weather, it
would take a week or two to travel on terrible roads all the way to
Augusta, the state capitol.177 Only three weeks remained, however,
before the inauguration of a new President. Time would run out

174

See supra notes 114 and 149 and accompanying text.
The presence of a Federalist majority in the House of Representatives was demonstrated on February 9, two days prior to the vote count, when the chamber met to
set the rules for the anticipated House runoff. By a vote of fifty-four to forty-five, the
Federalists set a rule that the “doors of the House shall be closed during the balloting” (Rule 5th), and insisted by a vote of fifty-three to forty-seven that the House
“shall not adjourn until a choice is made” (Rule 4th). See Historic Documents on
Presidential Elections: 1787–1988, at 76–78 (Michael Nelson ed., 1991); see also Letter
from Samuel Tyler to Gov. James Monroe (Feb. 9, 1801), in Original Letters, 1 Wm.
& Mary Q., 1st ser., 99, 102 (1892) (noting that “the Feds had a majority of six votes”
and had little difficulty getting their version of the rules adopted).
176
See James Rogers Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic 267 (1994).
177
Lord & Lord, supra note 62, at 79.
175
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before a delegation could complete its factfinding mission and return with a report to the nation’s capitol.178
With factfinding unfeasible, and the constitutional text obscure,
the proceedings might have simply disintegrated amidst a cloud of
bitter legalisms—the worst possible result. The nation was already
in an uproar over the Electoral College tie that had thrown the
presidency into the House. Confusion would have been compounded if the House runoff had been postponed indefinitely while
partisans quarreled without any obvious means of closing the debate. The year 1801 marked the first time in American history that
a political party was called upon to yield power to its rival. Even
without a prolonged debate over Georgia, it took almost a week
for the House to choose Jefferson over Burr on its thirty-sixth ballot.179 During this short period, the country was teetering on the
brink of violence. It is not at all clear whether the forces for violent
resolution could have been kept in check much longer.180
There was a good deal of constitutional prudence in Jefferson’s
decision to keep silent. Any express ruling from the chair invited
his opponents to initiate a counterproductive struggle between the
President of the Senate and the two houses of Congress over their
relative competence in the affair. In contrast, the notice from the
tellers hit just the right note—placing the burden on the Federalists
to raise an objection if there was any factual basis for supposing
that Georgia’s electors had cast their ballots for the Federalist candidates.
The wisdom of Jefferson’s decision is confirmed by another
pregnant silence over the next few weeks. As we have seen, leading
newspapers all around the country reported the problem with
178

The 1792 Act required the electors to send another envelope, containing a copy
of their ballot and the certificate of ascertainment, to a local federal district judge. Act
of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 239, 239–40. It seems likely that these documents
contained the same defects as those delivered to Washington, but we have not been
able to locate them. If our suspicions are correct, a hypothetical factfinding mission
would have required a good deal of time before getting to the bottom of the matter.
Even had the district judge opened his envelope to find a formally perfect electoral
ballot, it still would have taken too long for the mission to conclude its investigation
and return to Washington before Inauguration Day.
179
10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801).
180
The reality of mob violence and the risk of civil war is discussed at length in
Ackerman, supra note 41; see also Sisson, supra note 21, at 423–37 (providing a broad
range of evidence).
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Georgia’s ballot.181 Yet we have found no newspaper that contained
even a hint of an objection to Jefferson’s resolution of the issue—
and this at a time when so many other aspects of the Electoral College crisis generated ceaseless controversy. The ready acceptance
of this decision testifies to Jefferson’s wisdom in avoiding a grand
institutional confrontation that had no easy constitutional answer.
C. Pinckney for President?
To make a final point, suppose that Jefferson had singlemindedly pursued a formalist course. Once alerted to the problem
by the tellers, he publicly inspects the documents and proclaims
that the plain meaning of the Constitution requires him to disqualify the Georgia votes.182 This would have left Jefferson and Burr
with only sixty-nine votes remaining in their respective columns—
one shy of the seventy needed to exclude Adams, Pinckney, and
Jay from the House runoff.183 A shift to a five-man runoff would
have been legally significant, but would it have changed the final
outcome?
Winning the runoff proved difficult for Jefferson even when
Burr was his only opponent. Thanks to another Founding blunder,
the House making the choice was the lame-duck body elected in
1798—a year when the Federalists scored significant election victories.184 Although the party had suffered a number of defections, it
still controlled the House when its members voted in ordinary fashion.
But the runoff was decided under special constitutional rules giving each state delegation a single vote.185 This placed the Federalists
at a strategic disadvantage—too many of their congressmen were
bunched in too few states. When some Federalists defected to Jef181

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
Note that the law required all electors to vote on the first Wednesday in December and did not provide for any sort of re-vote. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat.
239, 239–40.
183
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing conditions for twocandidate and five-candidate runoffs).
184
1798 was the year of an emerging conflict with France, and the Federalists utilized
nationalist sentiment as a potent political weapon against the Republicans, who had
been consistently pro-French in their foreign policy. See Ackerman, supra note 41, at
61–62.
185
See supra Section I.B.
182
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ferson, the party could deliver only six states to Burr, while their
great antagonist won the vote of eight states. This would have generated an easy victory for Jefferson but for another technical glitch
by the Founders. The Constitution required the winning candidate
to gain an absolute majority of all state delegations without considering the possibility that some delegations might divide equally.
Had the Framers focused on this issue, perhaps they would have
awarded a half-vote to each of the contending candidates. The absence of specific instructions had a devastating impact in 1801,
however, when two of the states—Vermont and Maryland—split
evenly and failed to cast a ballot.186 As a consequence, Jefferson fell
one vote short of the nine required, and the initial ballot resulted in
a deadlock: eight for Jefferson, six for Burr, and two not voting.187
The second ballot revealed a drop in Jefferson’s support. Eleven
Federalists initially voted for Jefferson in recognition of the obvious fact that he, rather than Burr, was the Republican candidate
for President. When Jefferson fell short, five of these congressmen
returned to their party, giving Burr a two or three vote majority.188
Luckily for the Republicans, this shift in individual votes did not
change the balance of power in any state delegation, and the impasse continued until the thirty-sixth ballot, with the Federalists
desperately searching for a few additional votes. In the words of
Congressman James Bayard, a key Federalist leader, “By deceiving
one Man (a great blockhead) and tempting two (not incorruptible)
[Burr] might have secured a majority of the States.”189
186

10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801).
Id.
188
Under House rules, each member of a state delegation cast a secret ballot, and so
there is no formal record of the votes of individual representatives. A Republican
newspaper, however, the National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, published
lists of the three ballots attributing votes to individual members. National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, Feb. 13, 1801, at 3; National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, Feb. 16, 1801, at 2; National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, Feb. 18, 1801, at 3. It reported that Jefferson won the individual vote by a
margin of fifty-five to forty-nine on the first ballot, but that five defections occurred
on the second and subsequent ballots. Historic Documents on Presidential Elections:
1787–1988, supra note 175, at 85–88. Given the extreme partisanship prevailing at the
time, it would be a mistake to accept the Intelligencer’s count as authoritative. If there
is any sort of bias in this report, however, it seems likely that a Republican newspaper
would understate the extent of Federalist defection on the second ballot.
189
Letter from James A. Bayard to Alexander Hamilton (Mar. 8, 1801), in 25 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 344, 345 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977).
187
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Jefferson did prevail in the end,190 but the transformation of the
runoff into a five-candidate affair would have made this final victory more difficult. Burr was not the Federalists’ candidate of
choice—they backed him only as a last-ditch effort to stop their
archenemy Jefferson. With a five-man runoff, they could back real
Federalists, and this might have made a difference. As we have
seen, six Federalist congressmen were unwilling to vote for Burr,
but they might have been happy to vote for Adams. At the very
least, their blocking coalition would have had even more staying
power.191 In addition, after fifty or sixty ballots, the exhausted
House might have broken the impasse by selecting a compromise
candidate from among the three remaining contenders.
At this point, the Federalists’ vice-presidential candidate—
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney—would have likely emerged as an
exceptionally attractive dark horse. Pinckney was the sort of “continental character” the Founders envisioned as President, with a
long and distinguished record of public service. He had had a fine
career as a military officer during the Revolution192 and he served
as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.193 He also had es190

Professor Ackerman provides a blow-by-blow account of Jefferson’s victory in his
forthcoming book. See Ackerman, supra note 41.
191
Professor Manning Dauer’s research indicates one way to assess this point, as he
provides a table indicating the party affiliation of each member of the House of Representatives. Dauer, supra note 5, at 288–331. If one were to assume that all Federalists voted for the leading Federalist candidate in the five-man runoff, it is an easy matter to use Professor Dauer’s data to determine how the sixteen states would have
voted. The result: eight states vote Federalist (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina); six states
vote Republican (Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Virginia), and two states are evenly split (North Carolina and Vermont). This contrasts with the real-world results in the two-man runoff—where eight states voted for
Jefferson, six voted for Burr, and two split. 10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801).
Strict party-line voting, however, might not have prevailed if the Federalists had
been afforded an opportunity to vote for a Federalist candidate, and we provide a
more individualized analysis below. See infra note 199. Nevertheless, the hypothetical
party-line vote provides a rough sense of the order of magnitude of the shift that
would have been involved. Note, however, that the Dauer data does not yield a clear
victory to the Federalist candidate: The Constitution requires a total of nine votes,
and the hypothetical Federalist wins only eight. It is this conclusion that leads us to
speculate about Pinckney’s emergence as a compromise candidate in the text that follows.
192
Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: Founding Father 47–70
(1967).
193
Id. at 87–96.
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tablished a record of moderation during the 1790s—supporting his
party when it came to the war with France,194 but opposing it when
it came to the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts.195 He would
have had the wholehearted backing of the formidable Alexander
Hamilton.196 Indeed, once Adams left the scene, Pinckney became
the Federalist standard-bearer for the presidential elections of 1804
and 1808.197 Last but not least, Pinckney was a South Carolinian,
making him an especially attractive compromise candidate. The
bulk of Jefferson’s support was in the South.198 Had it become clear
that Jefferson could never win nine state delegations, his followers
194

Id. at 136–64.
Letter from William Vans Murray to John Quincy Adams (Mar, 22, 1799), in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1912, 529, 529–30
(1914).
196
Pinckney admired Hamilton. E.g., Letter from Charles C. Pinckney to James
McHenry (Oct. 31, 1798), in George Washington Papers (Library of Congress) (“I
knew that [Hamilton’s] talents in war were great, that he had a genius capable of
forming an extensive military plan, and a spirit courageous & enterprising, equal to
the execution of it.”) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Hamilton
conducted an aggressive campaign to elect Pinckney. He wrote letters to his comrades
telling them of his decision to support the South Carolinian. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick (May 10, 1800), in 24 The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, supra note 189, at 475, 475 (“I will never more be responsible for [Adams]
by my direct support—even though the consequence should be the election of Jefferson. . . . The only way to prevent a fatal scism in the Federal party is to support
G[eneral] Pinckney in good earnest.”) (emphasis omitted); Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to Charles Carroll (Aug. 7, 1800), in 25 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton,
supra note 189, at 60, 60 (“As between Pinckney & Adams I give a decided preference to the first.”). He traveled to New England and wrote to others of the support in
the North for Pinckney. Introductory Note to Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
Benjamin Stoddert (June 6, 1800), in 24 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra
note 189, at 574, 574–85; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Charles Carroll (July 1,
1800), in 25 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra note 189, at 1, 1–2; Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior (July 1, 1800), in 25 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton, supra note 189, at 4, 4–5 (“I have been in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire & Rhode Island. There is little doubt of Federal Electors in all. But there
is considerable doubt of a perfect Union in favour of Pinckney. The leaders of the
first class are generally right but those of the second class are too much disposed to be
wrong. It is essential to inform the most discreet of this description of the facts which
denote unfitness in Mr. Adams. I have promised confidential friends a correct statement. To be able to give it, I must derive aid from you. Any thing you may write shall
if you please be returned to you. But you must be exact & much in detail.”).
197
For a description of Pinckney’s role as the Federalist standard-bearer in the 1804
and 1808 campaigns, see Zahniser, supra note 192, at 234–60.
198
In the two-candidate runoff, Jefferson won all southern states except for South
Carolina. See 10 Annals of Cong. 1028 (1801).
195
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might have bitterly consented to the selection of another southerner of great distinction.199
All of this is sheer speculation, but Pinckney’s dark-horse candidacy gains a measure of reinforcement from one of our sources.
Writing thirty-five years after the event, Davis concludes his hearsay account by putting words in the mouth of Senator William
Wells, one of the three tellers: “Mr. Wells further stated, that if the
votes of Georgia had not been thus counted, as it would have
brought all the candidates into the House, Mr. Pinckney among the
number, Mr. Jefferson could not have been elected President.”200
Although Davis has been proven correct on his basic point about
Georgia, his story contains too many other minor errors to justify

199

A hypothetical scenario involving party-line voting in a five-candidate race was
presented previously. See supra note 191. We shall now analyze the real-world voting
in the two-candidate race and consider how Pinckney’s compromise candidacy might
have induced a swing in his direction. South Carolina consistently voted for Burr in
the two-man runoff, and it seems obvious that the state would have been more than
happy to shift to Pinckney, a favorite son. Pinckney also had obvious attractions for
North Carolina, whose delegation was split five to five along party lines. While the
state in fact cast its vote for Jefferson in the two-man runoff, Pinckney would have
been a far more attractive candidate than Burr. Indeed, at least one newspaper report
predicted that the state would split evenly when Burr was the only alternative.
American & Daily Advertiser (Baltimore), Jan. 15, 1801, at 2. A North Carolina vote
for Jefferson was hardly foreordained, especially if he had repeatedly demonstrated
his incapacity to win the nine votes needed to win the presidency.
The same is true of Georgia. Benjamin Taliaferro was elected as a Federalist but
often voted with the Republicans, see Dauer, supra note 5, at 315–25, and voted for
Jefferson over Burr in the runoff. National Intelligencer (D.C.), Feb. 13, 1801, at 3.
Nevertheless, he would have been under intense pressure from the Federalist establishment to vote for Pinckney as a compromise candidate.
With North Carolina and Georgia in his column, in addition to the block of six who
voted for Burr, Pinckney would have required only one more swing vote. Potential
support seems greatest from two states—Tennessee (voting one to zero for Jefferson)
or Maryland (splitting four-to-four between Jefferson and Burr). Id. New Jersey was
also teetering three-to-two during the Jefferson-Burr struggle, see id., and one of its
Republicans, James Linn, was frequently mentioned as a potential defector to the
Federalist cause. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 19,
1800), in 17 Madison Papers, supra note 5, at 444, 444–45 (“It is thought by some
that . . . Linn of N.J. will come over.”); see also Morton Borden, The Federalism of
James A. Bayard 88 (1955) (“Mr. Linn of [New] Jersey is . . . at present with us, which
gives the vote of that State—but might be thrown off.”) (citing Letter from John Dallas to Alexander Dallas (Jan. 15, 1801), in Alexander J. Dallas Papers (Historical Society of Pennsylvania)).
200
2 Davis, supra note 138, at 73.
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great confidence in this particular.201 Nevertheless, his decision to
mention Pinckney should not be discounted entirely. Whatever his
other failings, Davis was politically astute. He would not have included the reference if he thought the dark-horse candidacy was a
complete nonstarter.
So there it is: With Jefferson and Adams battling to a hopeless
impasse in the five-candidate runoff, the third President of the
United States might well have been Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.
Consider the resulting uproar when it was discovered, weeks
later, that Jefferson actually had won all four Georgia votes, and
that his constitutional punctilios as President of the Senate had led
to his own defeat by Federalist partisanship in the five-man runoff.
The resulting crisis would have been far worse than those occurring
in the aftermath of Hayes-Tilden in 1876 or Bush-Gore in 2000.
Both of these crises bitterly disappointed the losers, but they could
never prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they had actually
won the underlying electoral votes in controversy. In contrast, Jeffersonians would have been in a position to establish, to a certainty, that their candidate had been denied the presidency on a
mere technicality.
Perhaps, however, the operation of a final constitutional gimmick might have saved the situation. If the House of Representatives had selected Adams or Pinckney, it would have been up to
the Senate to select the Vice-President under yet another set of
rules. The Constitution generally gives this office to the defeated
presidential candidate with the most votes, but the Senate is authorized to choose among candidates “who have equal votes” after
the President has been selected—Jefferson or Burr in this case.202 If
the Senate had sought to console Jefferson with the number two
spot, a national crisis might have been avoided if Pinckney (or Adams) had responded to the subsequent news from Georgia by vol-

201

See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the
Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall
chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.”) (amended 1804).
202
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untarily allowing the Vice-President to become the fourth President of the United States.203
If Pinckney or Adams refused to resign the country might, however, have found itself on the brink of civil war. Even during the
two-man runoff, Republican governors were organizing military
force in the event the House Federalists managed to reject Jefferson. Jefferson himself was making some very dark threats during
the impasse.204 But in the end, the Federalists chose to abandon
Burr rather than push the country over the edge. Would they have
shown similar restraint had their favorites remained in the running? This was a crisis the infant republic did well to avoid.
D. Jefferson and the Rule of Law
When we first discovered Georgia’s electoral ballot in the National Archives, we believed we had a first-rate scandal on our
hands. The meaning of it all seemed painfully clear: Jefferson egregiously violated the express terms of the Constitution in the pursuit
of overweening ambition. His presidency was born of constitutional original sin. In its own way, this was as bad as Sally Hemings.
The more we have pondered, however, the less we have been
scandalized. To be sure, it is always a serious matter to ignore the
rules laid down by the text, even when they are incompetently
drafted. But in our constitutional tradition, the rule of rules is only
one component of a more complex understanding of the rule of
law.205 Placed in full historical context, Jefferson’s decision provokes
renewed appreciation for the complexities of constitutional interpretation, with three distinct dimensions salient in the present case. The
first—principle. As his actions in 1796 demonstrate, Jefferson was
203

At the time, the Senate was composed of nineteen Federalists and thirteen Republicans. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, at 692 (1960). In contrast to the runoff in the House, each senator
was to cast an individual vote. It was thus theoretically possible that the Federalists
would have awarded the vice-presidency to Burr rather than Jefferson, but this seems
quite unlikely.
204
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Feb. 15, 1801), in Jefferson Papers 998, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). For a comprehensive examination of the explosive situation, see Ackerman, supra note 41, at 93–135.
205
But see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175 (1989) (emphasizing the importance of rule-following in our legal tradition).
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serious about avoiding the “the phaenomenon of a Pseudopresident.”206 Invalidating the Georgia ballot on a legal technicality
would have been at war with this principle. Jefferson had ample
reason to believe that Georgia had in fact cast its votes for the Republican ticket. He was correct to use his power as Senate President to assure that the vote-counting ritual in Washington corresponded to the true electoral decisions made in the states. The
second—prudence. Jefferson was confronting a genuinely difficult
institutional question. A high-visibility ruling on the Georgia ballot
would have provoked an intense struggle between the President of
the Senate and the Houses of Congress over their respective constitutional prerogatives. So long as notice of the Georgia problem
had been conveyed to the opposition, was it not wise for Jefferson
to avoid such a counterproductive struggle if at all possible? The
third—pragmatism. Strict compliance with the formal rules risked
genuinely catastrophic consequences. Sending all five candidates
into the House runoff could have pushed the country to the brink
of civil war.
All in all, it was not the best moment for a rule of rules unvarnished by principle, prudence, or pragmatism to prevail. By recognizing this, Jefferson provides a glimpse into the meaning of constitutional statesmanship well worth bringing to light after all these
years.
E. Dumb Luck
A dose of historicism adds nuance to our earlier critique of the
Founding blunder—or better, blunders—in connection with the
construction of the Electoral College. Recall that the most significant mistake involved the Founders’ failure to anticipate the rise of
national political parties. Others were more perceptive, most notably Edmund Burke, who had already begun to reflect on this great
change in political practice.207 Had the Founders been equally far-

206

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), in
1 Select Works of Edmund Burke 69, 145–56 (Francis Canavan ed., 1999). Professor
Richard Hofstadter, the most acute historian of this subject, could not find anybody in
late eighteenth-century America who shared Burke’s views. Hofstadter, supra note
18, at 29–35.
207
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sighted, they would never have chosen their “two-vote” scheme for
the Electoral College.
Putting this big mistake to one side, it was still silly to give the
sitting Vice-President a central position in the vote count. Had the
Convention considered the likelihood that the President of the
Senate might run for the presidency, they would have changed the
text in a minute. But they did not, so they did not do so, and this
failure is nothing to brag about.
Nevertheless, the Georgia episode adds an ironic gloss to this
Founding blunder. To see our point, suppose that the Framers had
adverted to the problem and consider how they most probably
would have solved it: If the sitting Vice-President was a poor
choice to supervise the ballot count, who should be his replacement?
The obvious pick was the Chief Justice—the only constitutional
official possessing the impartiality required of the vote-counting
job. Indeed, the Founders made this choice when confronting a
similar problem in designing the impeachment process. The impeachment trial took place before the Senate, and the President of
the Senate would preside unless the Convention made a special exception for his removal from the chair. The Founders spotted the
absurdity of allowing the sitting Vice-President to preside over a
proceeding that could make him President. Article I, Section 3 explicitly provides that “When the President . . . is tried, the Chief
Justice shall preside.”208 They undoubtedly would have made an
identical substitution had they focused on the identical problem
raised by the vote-counting ritual.
This is the point at which our paradox emerges: Had the Founders possessed greater foresight, the result would have turned out

208

U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. For an explanation of this language, see William
Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 206 (Philadelphia,
H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (“As the vice president succeeds to the functions and
emoluments of the president of the United States whenever a vacancy happens in the
latter office, it would be inconsistent with the implied purity of a judge that a person
under a probable bias of such a nature, should participate in the trial—and it would
follow that he should wholly retire from the court.”). For an echo of this sentiment,
albeit in the context of factional politics, see The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own
cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.”).
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much worse. Jefferson’s replacement as chair on February 11
would have been John Marshall, whom the Federalists had placed
in office only the week before.209 While the Founding blunder
placed Jefferson in an awkward position, our ultimate conclusion is
that he made the best of a bad situation—elevating substance over
form and preventing a legitimation crisis of the first magnitude. In
contrast, Chief Justice Marshall would almost certainly have acted
differently. A confirmed Jefferson-hater,210 he would have found
himself in the delightful position of making a technically correct
ruling against Georgia that favored Federalist interests. Since the
Constitution explicitly requires that all the electors “sign and certify” their state’s return, and clearly designate the persons they
were “vot[ing] for,” the formal case was open and shut: “Sorry
Georgia, but you don’t count (and, alas, given the execrable postal
service southwards, your formal deficiency cannot be cured by
March 4).” So the Chief Justice rules that the vote total stands at
sixty-nine for Jefferson and Burr, one short of a majority, and the
Federalists get their men into the runoff.
To be sure, Marshall was eminently capable of transcending
formalism when it got in the way of his constitutional vision, but
this vision certainly did not include Thomas Jefferson as President
of the United States. Not even the most partisan Jeffersonian could
reasonably complain if the Chief Justice, following the express
commands of the Constitution, declared that there were only sixtynine valid votes in favor of Jefferson and Burr. After all, had not
the Founders put the Chief Justice in the chair precisely to assure
that vote counting would proceed in strict compliance with the
law?
No less important, the Jeffersonians would have been in no position to launch an effective challenge to Chief Justice Marshall’s decision. The Federalists controlled both houses of Congress and
would have voted down any Republican motion to overrule the

209

See 2 Beveridge, supra note 86, at 557–58.
See generally James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John
Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create a United States (2002) (discussing the lasting political battle between the two); Ackerman, supra note 41 (detailing Marshall’s
extraordinarily partisan conduct during February 1801).
210
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chair.211 If the Framers had done their homework, therefore, the
vote count would have provided Marshall with a splendid opportunity to enter history, slightly prematurely, as a great defender of
the written Constitution—but with a very different result.
Consider a few scenarios. Suppose that, despite Chief Justice
Marshall’s ruling, Jefferson emerged victorious from the five-man
runoff. Marshall then would have been clearly marked by Jefferson
as Public Enemy Number One. With the President threatening reprisals, would Marshall have had the courage to write Marbury v.
Madison?212 Would his fellow Justices have joined him in this premeditated assault on the Jeffersonian presidency? And even if they
had pushed forward, would the Supreme Court have emerged unscathed? After all, Jefferson’s campaign to sweep the Federalist
Justices from the Court only failed when the Senate refused to impeach Justice Samuel Chase in a very close vote.213 Jefferson would
have prosecuted this campaign even more fiercely had his great judicial antagonist sought to block his way to the presidency during
the vote count controversy.
Chief Justice Marshall’s prospects would have been no less grim
had his ruling led to the victory of his patron Adams,214 or his friend
Pinckney.215 At best, the Chief Justice would have tied his judicial
reputation to a ruling that would have been reviled by a large portion of the population; at worst, his decision of February 11 would
211

This contrasts with the institutional impasse that would have resulted if the Federalist Congress had sought to overrule Jefferson’s explicit ruling. See supra Section
IV.B.
212
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
213
See Simon, supra note 210, at 216–19. For a recap of this event, see Ackerman,
supra note 41, at ch. 5.
214
Despite his ascent to the bench, Marshall accepted Adams’s request to continue
serving as his Secretary of State and was discharging his office in an extraordinarily
partisan fashion. In early February, the Federalists in Congress and the administration
had rammed through a Judiciary Act creating a set of lower circuit courts. In his capacity as Secretary of State, Marshall played a leading role in filling these new positions with Federalist cronies, including two of his brothers-in-law—James Keith Taylor of Virginia and William McClung of Kentucky. See 2 Beveridge, supra note 86, at
560 n.2; 6 The Papers of John Marshall, supra note 97, at 78 n.2; Ackerman, supra
note 41, at ch. 2.
215
Pinckney often corresponded with Chief Justice Marshall, discussing the best
ways to promote Federalist interests. See, e.g., Letter from John Marshall to Charles
C. Pinckney (Nov, 20, 1800), in 6 The Papers of John Marshall, supra note 97, at 16,
16–17.
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have helped precipitate a bloody conflict over presidential succession.216
As we contemplate these scenarios it is impossible to mistake
the contribution of dumb luck to the affair—“dumb luck” in the
technical sense. By “dumb” we mean that the Founders were mistaken in putting the Vice-President in a constitutional situation
marked by an egregious conflict of interest; by “luck” we mean
that we are all lucky that they were dumb, since if they had been
smarter, things would have come out worse, possibly much worse.
V. JEFFERSON’S GHOST
Perhaps our discovery has historical value, but does it have enduring legal significance?
At the very least, the story serves as a cautionary tale. The republic avoided a serious crisis in 1801, yet there is no reason to rely
on dumb luck when lightning strikes again. We urgently require a
constitutional amendment removing the sitting Vice-President
from the chair. And yet, despite the 2000 fiasco, there has been no
serious effort to focus on the time bomb that might explode the
next time around if the existing vote-counting process operates
without judicial interference.
This failure has a single cause: the Supreme Court’s unanticipated intervention in the electoral contest between George W.
Bush and Albert Gore. While an Electoral College crisis is never
exactly fun, 2000 was the perfect year for it to happen. The country
was enjoying an unparalleled period of peace and prosperity. The
leading contenders made every effort to blur their underlying disagreements. Nobody supposed that there was much at stake in the
choice between Bush and Gore. If the Supreme Court had not intervened, Congress would have solved the succession problem in
one way or another, but in a way that would have emphasized the
obvious anachronisms and irrationalities of the existing system. As
the television cameras introduced countless viewers to the arcana
of the electoral count, everybody would agree on one thing—it was
a clear mistake to allow Vice-President Al Gore to preside over his
own contest with Bush, and we should pass a constitutional
amendment to eliminate such absurdities from future contests.
216

See Ackerman, supra note 41.
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Judge Richard Posner is precisely wrong, then, in asserting that
the looming electoral-count crisis on Capitol Hill serves as the only
sound justification for the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v.
Gore.217 The next vote-counting disaster probably will strike at a
much less propitious moment in the history of the republic—a time
when ideologically polarized political parties may be struggling for
the White House under conditions of grave economic or international distress. At such a moment, Judge Posner’s talk of crisis
might have real substance. When this time comes—in 2004 or
2084—the Supreme Court may be unwilling or unable to save the
day, and Americans will be forced to accept the antique legal arrangements the politicians of 2000 failed to address. Whatever the
jurisprudential merits of Judge Posner’s vaunted “pragmatism,” his
particular brand is particularly short-sighted. The election crisis of
2000 provided the “optimal” opportunity to generate the political
energy needed to spur constitutional amendment. If Bush v. Gore
has any sound justification, Judge Posner has not found it.218
A. From Cautionary Tale to Legal Precedent
It appears then, that we are stuck with what the Founders have
given us,219 at least until the next crisis forces the issue to the forefront of public concern. This disheartening conclusion returns us to
our motivating question: Since the original constitutional structure
continues to guide us, should Jefferson’s decision serve as an important legal precedent in interpreting its requirements?
Begin with the case for an affirmative answer. As we have seen,
the constitutional text does not clearly allocate decision-making
power between the President of the Senate and the Congress.
Worse yet, the text’s opacity merely serves as the tip of the Founding iceberg—the sad truth is that nobody was thinking about the
217

531 U.S. 98 (2000). See generally Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The
2000 Election, the Constitution, and the Courts (2001) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision was justified by pragmatic considerations of political stability).
218
In this he is not alone. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy
(Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (presenting perspectives on various justifications for the
Supreme Court’s decision to end the 2000 presidential election).
219
Of course, the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments importantly altered the
original mechanisms for presidential selection, but they do not speak to the particular
issue in question here: the power of the Senate President to resolve questions arising
with regard to the vote count. U.S. Const. amend. XII; U.S. Const. amend. XXII.
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problem in Philadelphia, and that is why the text is so unsatisfactory. Given this failure, even textualists should accord substantial
weight to subsequent practice in resolving constitutional indeterminacies.220 Ought implies can: If you can’t follow the text, you
should respect the conscientious practice of leading statesmen who
have attempted to make sense of textual perplexity.
The fact that Jefferson exercised the (textually arguable) authority, therefore, as Senate President on the Georgia matter seems
very significant as a legal matter.221 What is more, Jefferson’s ruling
220

For a case study on the dangers of a misguided textualism, see Kesavan, supra
note 5, at 1696–1759. Kesavan declares that the text forbids the President of the Senate from serving as the presiding officer of the vote count, despite the fact that he is
the only officer explicitly mentioned by the text, and despite two centuries of unbroken practice in which he has performed this role without the slightest challenge. Instead, Kesavan disqualifies the Senate President on the basis of emanations from
other constitutional clauses that do not explicitly speak to the problem. Id. at 1696–
1701.
Worse yet, he does not propose a plausible presiding officer substitute, instead stating that “[t]he answer to this question is simpler than it appears: One of the senators
and representatives then and there present at the electoral count.” Id. at 1701. In any
disputed election, however, each political party will want to have one of its own members serve as the presiding officer, and Kesavan does not say much about how best to
choose among the applicants for the job. He states merely that “[e]ach parliamentary
body has, almost by definition, the right to choose its presiding officer,” id., but fails to
consider that there are two parliamentary bodies involved and that they will predictably
disagree about whether a senator or representative should take the chair.
Early commentators also discussed the subject. Chancellor Kent stated that “the
president of the senate counts the votes, and determines the result, and that the two
houses are present only as spectators, to witness the fairness and accuracy of the
transaction, and to act only if no choice be made by the electors.” 1 James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law 258–59 (New York, O. Halsted 1826). He also said
that the Senate President has this power “in the absence of all legislative provision on
the subject.” Id. at 258.
Much more importantly, subsequent Congresses have clearly understood the Constitution to imply that the Senate President should serve as presiding officer, owing to
the fact that the Constitution commands him to open the electoral vote packages. Despite Kesavan’s repeated claims to have divined the one true meaning of the “text,”
his interpretations seem far less plausible than those that Congress has consistently
adopted over the course of two centuries.
221
The constitutional opinions of early Congresses have often been interpreted as
matters of great importance. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986)
(noting that records of the early Congresses provide “‘weighty evidence’ of the Constitution’s meaning” (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983))); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630–31 (1935) (looking to the laws of early
Congresses for support of its decision); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174–75
(1926) (stating that opinions of the First Congress “have always been regarded . . . as
of the greatest weight” in constitutional interpretation). This is hardly the place to
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might well have made a difference to the outcome—one of his rivals could have emerged victorious from a five-man runoff. This
greatly enhances the precedential significance of his ruling. While
there have been quite a few counting controversies over the centuries, almost all of them did not make the slightest difference to the
electoral outcome.222 With the stakes nonexistent, there was no
pressing reason for the participants to take the constitutional issues
seriously. They were more inclined to resolve the matter quickly,
so that the vote count could proceed to its predestined announcement of the victorious presidential candidate.223 Not so in 1801,
when the four Georgia votes were of the greatest strategic importance.
The fact that it was Jefferson in the chair also matters. Putting
hagiography to one side, he had devoted his four years as President
of the Senate to drafting that body’s first set of rules for parliamentary procedure224—rules that continue to influence the practice of
both the Senate and House of Representatives even today.
Finally, it would be wrong to dismiss and characterize Jefferson’s
ruling as merely self-interested. To the contrary, his decision can
consider, in general, when this reliance is justified as a matter of constitutional theory.
It suffices to say that it is justified in the present case.
222
The principal incidents are usefully summarized in Kesavan, supra note 5, at
1679–94. Although we find Kesavan’s interpretations of the Constitution unpersuasive, his piece contains an admirably exhaustive review of the relevant primary and
secondary literature.
223
Indeed, on several occasions, the President of the Senate has declared the results
in a manner that expressly deprived his resolution of any precedential status. The
practice began in 1821. Missouri had selected its electors before it had been formally
admitted as a state by Congress. When its electoral vote was opened, the propriety of
counting it was challenged. In response, the President of the Senate announced that
Monroe had been elected President regardless of whether Missouri’s vote was
counted. See Kesavan, supra note 5, at 1681–83. The Senate President finessed the
matter in an identical fashion during the vote count of 1837, in which the votes of
Michigan were at issue. Id. at 1685.
Vice-President Nixon took a similar approach when a late recount of the Hawaii
vote revealed that the Kennedy-Johnson ticket had carried the state. As Senate President, he refused to count the earlier electoral vote that had been awarded to the
Nixon-Lodge ticket on the basis of the pre-recount vote count. In counting the state’s
electors for his opponents, he declared that “[t]he Chair has knowledge, and is convinced that he is supported by the facts.” See 107 Cong. Rec. 290 (1961). He explicitly
stated, however, that he was counting these votes merely to avoid further delay, and
“without the intent of establishing a precedent.” Id.
224
Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of The Senate
of the United States (D.C., Samuel Harrison Smith 1801).
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be defended from the multiple perspectives of principle, prudence,
and pragmatism.225
So it would seem that if precedent is important anywhere in constitutional law, it would be important here—where a constitutional
statesman of the first rank, having spent years reflecting on matters
of parliamentary procedure, makes a ruling that illuminates a constitutional question that the Framers had so evidently failed to confront, let alone resolve, with any clarity.
So much for the affirmative case for precedential significance.
Are there any serious counterarguments? The most salient objection involves Jefferson’s failure to announce his ruling publicly.
Does not his refusal to take public responsibility for his decision
undermine its enduring significance?
This objection would be compelling if the legal deficiencies of
the Georgia ballot had been kept secret. If the House and Senate
had been kept in the dark, this would indeed deprive Jefferson’s
decision of any precedential value. It would indicate that Jefferson
himself believed that he was engaging in a devious maneuver that
could not withstand the test of public reason.
But this is not what happened. The newspaper accounts make it
perfectly clear that the tellers put the assembled House and Senate
on notice of the Georgia deficiency.226 Jefferson did not make his
decision secretly. He simply shifted the burden to the senators and
representatives to raise objections. While he might have gone further, in the manner of John Adams, his failure to do so was prudent under the circumstances.227 The assembled senators and congressman had an opportunity to make an objection, and they did
not make use of it.
Moreover, Jefferson publicly took responsibility for the entire
vote count: “[I]n pursuance of the duty enjoined upon him,” he declared that he and Burr had won “a majority of the votes of all the
Electors appointed.”228 He could not make this declaration without
counting the four Georgia votes in the Republican column. So the
225

See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126–31.
Even today, a challenge to an electoral vote requires at least one senator and one
representative to come forward and make his objections explicit. Otherwise, the
President of the Senate counts the vote. See supra note 171.
228
10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801).
226
227
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fact that he had made a ruling on the Georgia matter was obvious
to anybody interested in counting the votes—and surely the senators and congressman observing Jefferson were, like all politicians,
good at vote counting. No less important, the newspapers put the
country on notice of the Georgia deficiencies, and, despite the bitter partisanship of the time, nobody seems to have protested Jefferson’s decision.229
In short, Jefferson’s actions not only illuminate a constitutional
question left unresolved by the original constitutional text, but they
also resolved a potentially explosive problem in a manner that garnered public consent. What more can we ask of a legal precedent?
It is true, of course, that the relevant documents disappeared for
more than a century before they were rediscovered. This might be
important if other precedents had accumulated during the interim
that were inconsistent with Jefferson’s ruling. If this had occurred,
it might be wiser to ignore the rediscovered early precedent rather
than disturb well-established arrangements.
In the real world, however, the law remains unsettled. Apart
from 1801 and 2001, there is only one other case where the powers
of the Senate President posed a genuinely consequential issue. This
involved the Hayes-Tilden crisis of 1877, and as we shall see, the
resolution reached in 1877 should serve as a very important gloss
on the meaning of 1801.
It is one thing to recognize that the decision of 1801 is not the
only relevant precedent; it is quite another to say that it should not
count as a precedent when the Founding machinery once again explodes in our face.
B. The Gloss of 1877
The Hayes-Tilden election hit the nation at a bad time. The
country was in the throes of a vicious economic depression, and the
election returns threatened to inflame the passions of the recent
Civil War. For the first time since 1860, the Democratic candidate,
Samuel Tilden, had won the popular vote by a convincing margin
of 250,000.230 Yet his victory was jeopardized by a dispute over
eighteen electoral votes from three southern states still under the
229
230

See supra notes 126–31.
See Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt 320 (1935).
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(very shaky) control of Republican Reconstruction governments.231
If all eighteen found their way into the Republican column, Tilden
would be deprived of his popular victory by a single electoral vote.
With the Democrats clamoring at the gates of power, millions of
Republicans saw the impending vote count in apocalyptic terms inherited from the Civil War. For these true believers, the Democratic party was the party of treason, threatening to profane the
temple of the Union—a prospect to be avoided at all costs. What is
more, the antiquated electoral machinery afforded them an opportunity to bar the barbarians from the White House.
While the Democrats had won landslide victories in the House
after the Panic of 1873, the Republicans remained in control of the
Senate.232 This provided them with a tempting constitutional technique for maintaining control over the presidency. Vice-President
Henry Wilson had died in 1875, but the Republicans could still appoint the President Pro Tem of the Senate, who would then preside
over the vote-counting ritual.233 Their man in the chair could count
the challenged Republican electors into the Hayes column while
senators and representatives cheered and booed, but the Democrats could do little to change the outcome. Although the Democratic House might vote to overrule the chair, the Republican Senate would not support such a move—even if it were constitutional.
To be sure, the precedent set by Thomas Jefferson in 1801 was
not widely known at the time.234 Nevertheless, there was a good
deal of respectable constitutional opinion that expansively interpreted the Senate President’s power to “open” the electoral certificates, transforming it into a grander authority to resolve with some
finality doubtful questions arising in the vote-counting process. Indeed, some Democrats had explicitly endorsed this view in congressional debates held before the Hayes-Tilden election revealed

231

Charles Fairman, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, at 40–47,
57–116 (1988).
232
Democrats did not gain control of the Senate until the election of 1878. See 2
Congressional Quarterly, Guide to Congress 828 tbl. 30-1 (5th ed. 2000).
233
They selected Senator Thomas Ferry, a Michigan Republican. 1 Stanwood, supra
note 5, at 388.
234
Some memory traces clearly remained, however. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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its short-run partisan implications.235 This put Republicans in the
delicious position of quoting Democratic politicians while their
Senate President Pro Tem pushed Hayes into the White House.236
Delicious but dangerous—how would the country react to such
blatant partisanship? Fortunately, we will never know. In a remarkable show of political restraint, the Republican leadership refused to abuse the power of the Senate presidency for partisan
ends. Instead, they reached out to House Democrats to pass the
first statute in American history to regulate the vote-counting ritual. 237
The constitutional rationale for statutory action was based on
the structure of the text: “The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”238 Since the last
provision grants the federal government a distinct “counting
power,” but the preceding clauses do not clearly state how counting should proceed, Congress may enact appropriate legislation
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.239
235

See, e.g., 44 Cong. Rec. 1803 (1876) (statement of Sen. William Pinkney Whyte).
Not all Democrats were in agreement, however. See, e.g., 43 Cong. Rec. 970 (1875)
(statement of Sen. Bayard).
236
Republicans surely enjoyed reading of the views of Democratic Party Chairman
Abram Hewitt, who, after the Hayes-Tilden deadlock, had been vocal in asserting that
the Senate President could not decide matters himself, but rather should work with
“Congress to go behind the certificate and open the same to go into the merits of all
cases.” Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt 327 (1935).
237
The Democratic-controlled House, in response to a resolution proposed by Republican Representative George McCrary of Iowa, adopted legislation establishing a
committee to consider how to resolve the situation. 44 Cong. Rec. 91–92 (1876). The
Republican-controlled Senate then voted to establish its own committee. 44 Cong.
Rec. 258 (1876). Starting on January 12, the two committees met together, and their
collaborative efforts eventually generated the statute. 44 Cong. Rec. 613 (1877); 44
Cong. Rec. 1050 (1877).
238
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
239
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. One does not need to look hard to find references to
this clause as the basis for action to regulate the electoral count. 43 Cong. Rec. 974–75
(1875) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); 43 Cong. Rec. 971–73 (1875) (statement of Sen.
Thurman); 10 Annals of Cong. 29–32 (1800). A decade later, the drafters of the Electoral Count Act assumed that the Necessary and Proper Clause was the part of the
Constitution that gave them the authority to act. 48 Cong. Rec. 5461 (1884); Counting
Electoral Votes, supra note 5, at 455 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). Consistent congressional practice of the past 125 years presupposes the Act’s constitutionality, as
does the recent Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000),
whose reasoning depends critically on Florida’s presumed unwillingness to sacrifice
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This straightforward rationale provided the Republican leadership with a solid platform for constructing a far more impartial
procedure, calculated to assure the country of the integrity of the
selection process. The proposed statute established a fifteen-man
Electoral Commission comprised of five members of the House of
Representatives, five senators, and five Justices of the Supreme
Court. Each house was to appoint three members from the majority party and two from the minority—leading to a five-five split in
the congressional delegation. The proposed statute also named
four of the five Justices—two Democrats and two Republicans—
and charged them with the task of naming a fifth as potential tiebreaker.240 Although their choice was formally open, it was perfectly obvious who they were supposed to choose: Justice David
Davis of Illinois. While he had begun his career in national politics
as Abraham Lincoln’s campaign manager in 1860, Davis had
drifted away from the party’s mainstream. By 1876, he was broadly

the benefits provided to its electoral vote by the statute’s “safe harbor” provision.
Nevertheless, Vasan Kesavan urges us to reject this consistent practice in favor of
an implausible interpretation of the constitutional text. Recall that the Constitution
grants Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution . . . all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. According to Article II,
officers of the government are plainly vested with the power to “open” and to
“count” the electoral ballots. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. Nevertheless, Kesavan asserts that it “is more than doubtful” that this grant counts as a “power” within the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Kesavan, supra note 5, at 1737.
Kesavan’s comments fail to convince. He points to the fact that Article II does not
explicitly use the word “power,” or some verbal analogue, in granting vote-counting
authority. Id. at 1735–38. But why should this verbal technicality matter? Authority to
count the votes is a “power” within the ordinary meaning of the term, and Kesavan
gives no special reason for a narrowing construction, especially provided the generous
interpretation traditionally given to the scope of the clause. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Kesavan adds that the constitutional concept of “power” requires that its holder
have discretion in its exercise and that, in his view, the vote counters have no such
discretion—they are simply to determine which votes are valid, and count only those.
Kesavan, supra note 5, at 1737 n.351. Even if Kesavan were correct in viewing the
power as nondiscretionary, it still remains a power, and a statute is still “necessary
and proper” given the text’s failure to make clear who should exercise the power in
doubtful cases. In our view, it would require a far more compelling argument to override the deference that is due to the consistent practices of the Congress and the Supreme Court.
240
Act of January 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 228.
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considered to be an independent with Democratic leanings, someone who would be fair to Tilden’s claim.241
All things considered, the Republicans’ proposed statute made
the most of the constitutional materials available. By placing the
final decision in Davis’s hands, the leadership had effectively
eliminated the prospect of partisan self-dealing by the President of
the Senate. To be sure, the statute was cleverly designed to preserve the Senate President’s symbolic centrality. He was assigned
the task of “open[ing]” the ballots, but should a protest be voiced
from the floor, he was instructed to pass the contested ballot to the
Commission and await its decision before completing the vote
count.242 The Commission’s decisions, in turn, could be overruled
by a majority vote of each house of Congress acting separately,243
but this was unlikely given the split in party control. The danger of
self-dealing posed by the Senate President had been subordinated
to a Commission carefully designed to achieve an impartial result.
This fact was widely appreciated as the Senate bill made its way
to the House for consideration. Just before the final vote in the
House, Henry Payne, a Democratic leader and future member of
the Electoral Commission,244 urged his skeptical colleagues to consider the alternative: Without the statute, the Senate President
might fill the constitutional vacuum with “a bold and unjustifiable
usurpation.”245 Other thoughtful Democrats supported this plea.
Here is Henry Watterson:
I regard Tilden’s case as a good one; but I shall vote for the bill
with the full consciousness that the action of the commission may
bitterly disappoint me . . . . If it does, I shall still have discharged
[my] duty in that manner which was best calculated to preserve
constitutional forms and keep the peace of the country at a time

241

Fairman, supra note 231, at 48–49; Willard L. King, Lincoln’s Manager: David
Davis 290–93 (1960).
242
Act of January 29, 1877, § 2, Ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227, 228-29 (1877). The case of single
returns was to be handled by the two houses meeting separately, with a majority vote
of each required to reject the return. Id. § 1.
243
Id. § 2.
244
Fairman, supra note 231, at 10, 47–48.
245
44 Cong. Rec. 1050 (1877).
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when the Republic was menaced and the people were not pre246
pared for war.

And so a bipartisan group of leaders carried off a grand act of
constitutional statesmanship, with the House joining the Senate to
head off the possibility of willful abuse of power by the Senate
President. This represented a remarkable act of self-restraint on
the Republican side.247 They had sacrificed the certainty of a Hayes
presidency, through manipulation by the Senate President, for a
mere possibility from the Commission. But in return, they obtained
a greatly enhanced sense of constitutional legitimacy for the next
President of the United States.
Unfortunately, this triumph of statesmanship has been entirely
lost in the fog of controversy subsequently generated by the actions
of the Electoral Commission. The key to the entire plan was the
appointment of Justice Davis—the only man on the Supreme
Court with a plausible claim to political neutrality. To nearly everyone’s surprise, a Democratic-Greenback coalition in Illinois
elected Davis to the United States Senate on January 25, just as the
Electoral Commission bill was being enacted by Congress.248 When
Davis resigned from the Commission to take his Senate seat, he
was replaced by Joseph Bradley—a distinguished jurist, but one
plainly associated with the Republican party.249 This allowed the
Democrats to charge him with the rankest partisanship when he
joined the seven other Commission Republicans in party-line votes
in support of all eighteen of the Republican electors, over the
heated dissent of the seven Commission Democrats.250
The Democrats’ cries of pain were only to be expected. It always
hurts to lose. It remains an open—and probably unanswerable—
246

Id. at 1007.
Unsurprisingly, the Republican rank and file was relatively unenthusiastic about
ceding the power of the Senate President to a bipartisan commission. While the entire
Senate voted 47 to 17 in favor of the bill, the Democrats supported it by a lop-sided
margin of 26 to 1, while the Senate Republicans divided narrowly with 21 in favor and
16 opposed. Id. at 913. Similarly, House Democrats voted 186 to 18 in favor while
House Republicans voted against by a margin of 85 to 52, with the final count at 191
in favor and 86 opposed. Roy Morris, Jr., Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes,
Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876, at 218 (2003).
248
Morris, supra note 247, at 217–18.
249
Id. at 218–19.
250
See id. at 222–25.
247
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question whether Bradley in fact succumbed to political pressures.
Despite a vigorous effort by Charles Fairman to defend Bradley’s
integrity,251 the Commission still remains under a dark cloud in legal circles.252 Whatever one makes of Bradley’s performance, it
should not taint the statesmanship of those who created the Commission as an alternative to a ruling by the Senate President. While
Bradley’s decision was bound to be controversial, a blatantly partisan decision by the President Pro Tem of the Senate would have
been far worse—inflicting grievous damage on the Hayes presidency and the slow process of post-war reconciliation.
One can only hope that similar statesmanship prevails the next
time around, and that a new Electoral Commission is convened to
resolve the problem. The 1877 statute, however, was a one-shot
deal, and when Congress finally enacted a more permanent statute,
it did not entirely eliminate the risk that the Senate President
might once again dominate the vote-counting ritual.
C. The 1887 Act
Controversy over the Electoral Commission generated a decade
of congressional debate, which finally gave rise to the Electoral
Count Act of 1887.253 Operating once again under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the statute shifted a great deal of the decisional
burden from the President of the Senate to the two houses of Congress. Speaking broadly, if a state submits a single return, the
President of the Senate counts the ballot unless objections are
raised and a majority in each house votes to reject it.254 If a state

251

Fairman, supra note 231, at 123–58.
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 Tex.
L. Rev. 1985, 2004 (2003) (“Although the Commission was seen by many to be completely fraudulent, the Democrats ultimately did accept its results, in exchange for an
understanding that President Hayes would effectively end Reconstruction and would
not run for re-election . . . .”). All of the leading books by historians echo Issacharoff’s
comments. See Morris, supra note 247, at 222–25; Lloyd Robinson, The Stolen Election: Hayes Versus Tilden: 1876, at 164–68 (2001); C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and
Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (2d ed. 1966).
253
3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
254
Id. The “safe harbor” provision enacts into law a preference for picking electors
by passing state laws governing the selection process. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). This statutory provision encourages states to pass laws “prior to the day fixed for the appoint252
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submits two or more returns, the President’s job is also straightforward if majorities of both houses agree on the ballot that should
be counted. Matters get murkier when the Houses disagree. In this
case, the statute instructs the President to count the ballot certified
by “the executive”255 of the state. But what should he do if “the executive” signs two or more returns?
The statute is silent, but the problem is real—especially where
different members of “the executive” are elected independently.
For example, Florida’s Democratic Attorney General Robert Butterworth strongly supported Gore,256 and Republican Secretary of
State Katherine Harris produced opinions that notoriously favored
Bush.257 Suppose that the United States Supreme Court had remained on the sidelines and that the Florida court recount had
given Gore’s electors a razor-thin majority. As matters became
more heated, Governor Jeb Bush may well have decided to sign
this second return, but even if he refused, the Florida Supreme
Court could have authorized the Attorney General to certify the
return and send it on to the President of the Senate. When Senate
President Al Gore opened the ballots on vote-counting day, he
would have found two Florida returns signed by members of the
“executive”—one for Bush and the other for Gore. Under the 1887
statute, each house must separately decide between the rival slates.

ment of the electors” and discusses the more favorable treatment a state abiding by
that rule will receive in Congress. Id.
255
3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (“But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of the
counting of such votes, then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal
thereof, shall be counted.”).
256
See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, A Staunch Gore Ally Influences Florida Ballot Fight,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2000, at A27; Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Barstow, Election
Officials Focus of Lobbying From Both Camps, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2000, at A1 (“In
Volusia County, the only Florida county to complete a full hand recount, the state’s
attorney general, Robert A. Butterworth, placed an unsolicited phone call a week ago
to elections officials, advising them that they had the legal authority to go forward
with a manual recount.”).
257
See, e.g., David Barstow, Data Permanently Erased From Florida Computers,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2001, at A10; Richard L. Berke, 2 Sides Maneuver: Republican
Rejects Offer That 2 Sides Accept a Count by Hand, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2000, at A1
(“Ms. Harris . . . announced . . . that it was ‘my duty under Florida law’ to reject requests from several counties to update their totals.”).
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If they were to disagree—which was likely, but not certain258—the
issue would have quickly returned to the President of the Senate.
What next?
Foreseeing this scenario, one of us signed a public statement urging Congress to follow the precedent of 1877 and create a new
Electoral Commission.259 This should be the remedy of choice the
next time around, but if statesmanship fails, the ghost of Thomas
Jefferson will return to center stage and we shall all be obliged to
conjure with the meaning of his actions on that fateful day of February 11, 1801.
Jefferson’s precedent will not be squarely on point. The future
President of the Senate will be required to act only after the issue
has divided the House and Senate. In contrast, Jefferson resolved
the Georgia matter without consulting the two houses, and we cannot know how he might have responded had one or both houses
challenged his decision.
Nevertheless, there can be no denying that Jefferson did more
than “open” the Georgia ballot on that fateful day. He asserted his
authority to decide the merits on a contestable issue. If some future
Senate President were to claim a similar authority, he or she would
not be wrong in pointing to Jefferson’s precedent.
If he follows Jefferson’s lead, however, he cannot be allowed to
go halfway. Jefferson used his power for a particular end—“to prevent the phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president.”260 This should be
the touchstone for any future President of the Senate. If he abuses
258

On January 3, 2001, the Republicans controlled the House of Representatives by
a margin of 223 to 211, whereas the Democrats controlled the evenly-divided Senate,
with Gore casting the deciding vote (and Lieberman casting one of the fifty Democratic votes). See Helen Dewar & Juliet Eilperin, Divided Congress Takes Oath with
Promises of Unity, Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2001, at A8. It would be a mistake however, to
assume strict party-line voting. Representatives and senators alike would have been
swayed by prevailing sentiment in their own districts, as well as their own views on the
merits. After all, Gore was the clear winner in the popular vote, and it is impossible to
guess how heavily public opinion would have emphasized this point if the Supreme
Court had not prematurely terminated the debate.
259
See Emergency Committee of Concerned Citizens 2000, The Election Crisis, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 10, 2000, at A31 (“Perhaps a bipartisan National Electoral Commission
of the Congress and the Supreme Court will have to settle the matter, based on the
precedent set in resolving the disputed election of 1876.”). This was signed by Professor Ackerman, among others.
260
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 16, 1797), in 16 Madison
Papers, supra note 5, at 461, 461.
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his authority to create a “Pseudo-president” by blatantly political
vote counting, he would be converting Jefferson’s precedent into a
fig-leaf for a desperate act of political usurpation.

